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This thesis was conducted to a large size corporation located in the capital region of Finland. 
The purpose was to develop the case company’s corporate security service. First, it required 
the mapping of the level of corporate security, after which the situation was monitored in the 
case company. After gathering of the research material the results were formed. 
  
The thesis was conducted as a qualitative research. Since a strict tie to theory is not a fea-
ture of qualitative research, the study does not take advance of a firm way of thought. To 
clarify the research process, the Capability Maturity Model Integration for Services –maturity 
model was used as a loose framework. Out of all the model’s process areas ten were chosen, 
and the model was flexibly applied in order to provide more fruitful information. 
 
The study utilized documentation analysis, interviews and observation. The documents were 
related to the company’s security such as memoranda, descriptions, plans and general docu-
ments. The interviews consisted of sixteen questions of which six were general questions and 
ten process area questions. Twelve persons from different levels of the company participated 
in the interviews, conducted as individual interviews. The observation period was during the 
year 2016 and consists of the author’s entries. Throughout the year 25 entries were produced. 
In addition, the performance of the company was evaluated with the maturity model. 
 
The results of the study are formed via the methods above. The interviews and observations 
form a picture on the current state of corporate security and on how it is understood in the 
case company. Documentation analysis goes through the longer period development of corpo-
rate security. The development proposals are presented at the end. 
 
The research results were compared to the process areas and maturity model evaluation. On 
average, Capability level is - “performing”, while Maturity, stays in level one - “Initial”.  The 
highest evaluation scores were reached on the following process areas: Work planning, Work 
Monitoring and Control and Supplier Agreement Management. The Risk Management compo-
nent was ranked to be the most underdeveloped. 
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Tämä tutkimus tehtiin Suomen pääkaupunkiseudulla sijaitsevaan keskisuureen yritykseen. 
Opinnäytetyön tavoite on kehittää ao. yrityksen yritysturvallisuuspalvelua. Palvelun kehittä-
minen vaati ensin yritysturvallisuuden tason kartoittamista, jonka jälkeen tilannetta seurat-
tiin yrityksessä. Tutkimusmateriaalin keräysvaiheen jälkeen alkoi tulosten muodostaminen.  
 
Tutkimus suoritettiin laadullisena tutkimuksena. Koska kvalitatiiviselle tutkimukselle ei ole 
ominaista tiukka teoriasidonnaisuus, tutkimus ei hyödynnä täysin valmista ajatusmallia. Tut-
kimuksen kulun selkeyttämiseksi löyhänä viitekehyksenä työssä toimii Capability Maturity Mo-
del Integration for Services -kypsyysmalli. Mallista valikoitiin kymmenen soveltuvaa prosessi-
aluetta, ja sitä sovellettiin tutkimuksessa joustavasti, jotta opinnäyte tuottaisi enemmän ja 
hedelmällisempää tietoa. 
 
Tutkimuksessa hyödynnettiin dokumenttianalyysia, haastatteluja ja havainnointia. Dokumen-
tit olivat yrityksen turvallisuuteen liittyviä pöytäkirjoja, kuvauksia, suunnitelmia ja yleisiä 
dokumentteja. Haastattelut koostuvat 16 kysymyksestä, joista kuusi oli yleisiä kysymyksiä ja 
kymmenen oli prosessialuekysymyksiä. Haastatteluihin osallistui 12 yrityksen eri asemissa 
työskentelevää tai työskennellyttä henkilöä. Haastattelut toteutettiin yksilöhaastatteluina. 
Havainnointi tapahtui vuoden 2016 aikana ja koostui tekijän omista muistiinpanoista. Vuoden 
aikana kertyi yhteensä 25 erillistä kirjausta. Lisäksi yrityksen suoritusta arvioitiin kypsyysmal-
lin avulla. 
 
Tutkimustulokset muodostettiin käyttämällä edellä mainittuja metodeja. Haastattelut ja ha-
vainnointi muodostavat kuvan yrityksen nykyisestä tilasta sekä siitä, miten yritysturvallisuus 
käsitetään yrityksessä. Lisäksi haastatteluissa kysyttiin, miten yritys suoriutuu kypsyysmallin 
vaatimuksista. Dokumenttianalyysissä käydään lävitse yritysturvallisuuden pitkäaikaista kehi-
tystä. Lopuksi on esitetty kehitysehdotuksia. 
 
Tutkimustuloksia verrattiin prosessi alueisiin ja kypsyys mallin arviointiin. Keskimäärin Kyvyk-
kyys taso on – ”Performing”, kun Kypsyys pysyi tasolla yksi – ”Initial”. Korkeimmat arviot sai-
vat seuraavat prosessialueet: työn suunnittelu, työn seuranta ja hallinta ja toimittaja sopi-
musten hallinta. Riskienhallinta arvioitiin alisuoriutuneimmaksi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avainsanat: Yritysturvallisuus, Turvallisuuden kehittäminen, Turvallisuusjohtaminen, CMMI, 
Kyvykkyys, Kypsyys 
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1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to research the development of corporate security service and 
recognize useful practices to develop it. This thesis was done to a case company which oper-
ates mainly in the field of planning and consulting of infrastructure. The thesis was executed 
as a qualitative study to the case company’s corporate security service. The development is 
researched by using documentation analysis, interviews, and observation. To evaluate the 
development a measurement system was required. Capability Maturity Model Integration with 
the author’s modification offered a concrete platform to give a level system to measure the 
corporate security service. 
 
Corporate security is part of every company’s functions. Its size and visibility is linked to the 
area of business and to the size of a company. Establishing corporate security service increas-
es resilience. On one hand, it is passive and might never be needed if a company is lucky 
enough to never face any security issues. On the other, the future can never be predicted 
with certainty. One of the interviewees verbalized it well. “Some skipper can sail with poor 
skills his lifetime without being ever shipwrecked, but it can be just good luck and some good 
skipper can run shipwreck once in a while.” (Interviewee K 2016. Personal communication.) 
 
Corporate security itself contains the risk of becoming rather a burden in bureaucratic and 
economical form rather than a useful instrument. In the worst case it can realize itself as a 
cost in a company’s budget which does not contribute to the company’s operating profit.  
This rises a reasonable question: Why a company should develop corporate security in the 
first place and not to accept the current level? 
 
Corporations have different kind of needs for corporate security, and it’s crucial to set the 
correct target level in order to create successful security management system. Companies 
that decide to be happy with the current situation represent the skipper who has not ground-
ed a ship during his lifetime. Still these skippers are sailing. This thesis aims to offer guidance 
to those skippers who are willing to improve their skills so that in the time of corporate secu-
rity breach the horizon is clear. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
 
The topic of developing corporate security service was chosen with the case company’s repre-
sentatives. Since 2013 the case company has had a part-time Chief Security Officer (CSO). 
Though some progress has been achieved, not all the processes are clear or managed as 
properly as they could be. This situation gave the idea to develop corporate security service. 
The thesis is at the same time a design research and a development project. 
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According to Kananen, design research does not have its own methodology and other method-
ologies are used for development aiming to an objective. Development work converts to a 
research, when scientific methods, which produce reliable and new knowledge, are applied to 
the work and documentation. The research has to have a research objective for the develop-
ment. (Kananen 2013, 20-25). 
 
This thesis is conducted via qualitative methods, and therefore no strict theory is adequate. 
Qualitative research is free from preconditions and assumptions, which may end up with in-
venting a new theory from down to top (Eskola & Suoranta 1998, 14-15 and 19). Of course, in 
order to provide for a clear presentation about the progress of the research, the Capability 
Maturity Model Integration for services – CMMI - serves as a loose framework. For example, 
the development proposals in chapter seven for the benefit of the case company are partially 
based to CMMI. The adjusted CMMI is explained in chapter four. 
 
Nonetheless, qualitative approach allows the object rather speak for itself than try to make it 
fit a certain given way of thought. In fact, such an open-minded attitude could help the re-
searcher to find wholly new perspectives. The so called “research-related imagination” does 
not inevitably produce unnecessary information: on the contrary, speculating with possibili-
ties might better reflect the reality than a strict source material-bounden approach (Eskola & 
al. 1998, 20). 
 
A second advantage of the chosen framework is that it enables a more profound, even trian-
gulate, understanding of the multi-faceted essence of corporate security. As Cabric puts it, 
corporate security still remains a mystery for many. The role of corporate security contains 
many controversies and internal conflicts which lead to the misunderstanding of the whole 
concept (Cabric 2015, xiii). Cabric continues that the attitude towards security as an unnec-
essary expenditure is slowly changing and the additional value it generates is recognized. Yet, 
he sees that the “the actual trust and understanding are still missing” (2015, xiii). 
 
The previous statement characterizes the situation in the case company relatively well. E.g. 
interviewee K compared the state of security management to a state of fermentation. To 
conduct an effective study in the mentioned state, the CMMI offered a workable platform to 
analyze and develop corporate security. In total, CMMI for services has 24 process areas out of 
which ten were chosen with the case company’s CSO. Having selected the most suitable pro-
cess areas the CMMI evaluation logics were adapted to suit the thesis’s aim. Instead of the 
rough original ranking, the evaluation scale was softened to be flexible and therefore more 
informative. 
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2.1 Research Questions 
 
According to Kananen (2013, 60) there are various models how to conduct a design research, 
but all of them begin by defining the research problem. The research problem in this thesis 
was the overall evaluation of the corporate security service and its implementation in the 
case company. 
 
It’s worth noticing that this thesis uses corporate security definitions to define the subject, 
but it is not researching corporate security itself as a topic. This thesis focuses on corporate 
security development through a capability & maturity model designed to measure maturity of 
a service. 
 
The qualitative approach generated three research questions: 
 What is the current level of the corporate security service? 
 How process areas should be developed? 
 How to reach the target level of corporate security service? 
 
First, the initial state of corporate security service in the case company has to be sorted out 
to have a comprehensive picture of the research object. Identification of the current level of 
corporate security will be done through analyzing documents, observation and interviews. 
These form the basis from where to start the development need assessment. 
 
After understanding the current state, the benefits and defects of the process areas can be 
pinpointed, and development proposals charted. Finally, the results are summed up and real-
istic aims can be set to develop corporate security service. The recommendations are then 
presented to the security team of the company, which decides whether to implement or not 
the proposals. 
 
2.2 Definitions 
 
In this section corporate security service is explained. The following terms are clarified be-
low: Corporate security, Development, Service, Corporate security development and Corpo-
rate security service. Also the corporate security model of the Finnish Confederation of Finn-
ish Industries (EK) is given a deeper review. 
 
 
The Finnish Confederation of Finnish Industries corporate security model 
EK is according to their website (Mitä teemme? 2017) an employer union which operates for 
the improvement of the business environment for businesses and bolster the services of mem-
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ber associations. EK (2016, 2) defines corporate security as follows: Corporate security is 
safety & security of all the operations and it has five key elements: Personnel, Reputation, 
Information, Assets and Environment. These are basic assets which are present in every com-
pany. However, depending on the company’s business operations the emphasis of areas var-
ies. Therefore, every company has its unique needs for corporate security. The functions of 
the corporate security model and core values are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Strategy 
Corporate security is part of the corporation’s quality system and it creates additional value. 
Therefore, it’s beneficial for corporations to commit to the continuous development of corpo-
rate security. Standardization, quality and metrics of the corporate security procedures give 
clear picture from the corporate security activities to the corporation and partners without 
detailed exhibition (EK 2016, 2-3). 
 
Risk management 
The model encourages companies to do a comprehensive risk assessment on security threats 
and from consequences of the threats in case of they realize. According to the model the 
recognition of threats, risk assessment and risk management are central preconditions for 
defining corporate security and measuring it. Security and vulnerability assessments are part 
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Figure 1: The Finnish Confederation of Finnish Industries corporate security model 
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of recognizing threats, evaluating the magnitude of the treats and part of preparing to them. 
(EK 2016, 2-3). 
 
The EK-model advices corporations to tie central stakeholders and partners to the risk man-
agement process. The aim of security measures and risk management is not only to delete 
and reduce risk, but also give opportunities to the corporation to take risks. (EK 2016, 2-3). 
 
Security leadership & culture 
The development of security activities can be established through orientation to statistics on 
accidents, security deviation and loss & damage. Compiling high-quality security instruction 
may also develop security activities of a corporation. Creating good security culture, increas-
ing security awareness and training the personnel is very important. It is necessary for a cor-
poration to have leadership and communications system in order to secure the functioning of 
the corporation in all situations. Feedback from security issues shall be given to the personnel 
of the corporation and stakeholders and they should be encouraged to notify safety and secu-
rity in all activities. (EK 2016, 2-3) 
 
Corporate security measures are used to protect corporation’s core values. Purpose of corpo-
rate security is to ensure the business continuity, enhance competiveness and improve 
productivity. According to the definition security management is normal part of the manage-
ment of a company. The aim is to secure the continuity of the corporation, meaning that all 
the required standards are met in every situation. 
 
EK has developed a corporate security model which provides for a base to understand corpo-
rate security field. An important notification is that the industry area and business model of a 
corporation steer the importance of different areas of corporate security. The importance of 
different security fields varies depending on the corporation and business area. Essential is to 
develop the relevant security fields. The concept of continuous development has been taken 
into account in the model (EK, 2016, 3). 
 
According to Leppänen (2006, 14-15) the whole of security management includes thousands of 
actions of personnel and events, and the process of single risk evaluation & management of a 
single person can be held as a starting point of security management. Corporate security 
management requires process which takes in consideration the specific features of a company 
and the requirements to fulfill the role of corporate security management to support the en-
tire business. Security management and operative risk management in all qualitative scales 
and breakdowns can be built as a supportive process of the business to search, analyze, repair 
and follow compromising factors. Leppänen (2006, 14-15). 
 
 12 
Leppänen (2006, 58) continues that the only correct perspective to security management is 
the ownership perspective. From this perspective corporate security and security manage-
ment focus to maximize the return on invested capital. Creating a successful corporate secu-
rity management system requires knowledge and good understanding of the business the 
company does. This perspective is reasonable because corporate security is above all a sup-
portive process. 
 
According to Kovacich & Halibozek (2003, 63) corporate security and the CSO’s tasks are of-
ten viewed as a necessary evil. One reason for this is the corporate security perspective 
which may demand another kind of approach, how processes should work instead of what 
business has planned. They continue that corporate security is often seen as an overhead cost 
and does not contribute to the company’s profit. Finally, if corporate security is not executed 
efficiently enough it can be a “parasite on the profits.” (Kovacich & Halibozek 2003, 64). This 
definition has negative approach to corporate security, though it is acceptable and realistic.  
 
It is important to exclude corporate security and security business. While security business is 
selling security services and equipment in order to gain profit, corporate security is a support-
ive service or activity which is to secure corporation’s key activities.  
 
Service 
The definition of service is defined by the CMMI for services as an intangible, non-storable 
product (2010, 38). Because of the broad definition the model is usable with various sectors 
of service, including corporate security. 
 
Development 
This term is defined by the Cambridge dictionary (Cambridge University Press, 2016) as a pro-
cess in which someone or something grows or change and becomes more advanced. In this 
definition, development has two factors growing and changing as one and becoming more ad-
vanced as another. Business Dictionary defines development as: “The systematic use of scien-
tific and technical knowledge to meet specific objectives” or requirements” or as “an exten-
sion of the theoretical or practical aspects of a concept, design, discovery or invention.” 
(Business dictionary, 2016 defines development). 
 
The first definition has two factors: there are means how to develop through scientific or 
technical knowledge. The second factor are the specific objectives or requirements. The sec-
ond definition suggests that development is utilizing already existing concept, design, discov-
ery or invention through extension of aspects the object has. The Cambridge Dictionary defi-
nition has a positive expectation for development and it has an objective which is evolving. 
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This definition may not be used for example when following a scenario and the outcome after 
a period of time. 
 
The first definition of Business Dictionary includes a goal in the definition, though it is not 
mentioned. It also states that there is a use of knowledge to meet the set goal. The second 
definition of the Business Dictionary suggests that there is an existing object or notion which 
can be processed further through utilizing extension of either theory or practice of the object 
or notion. 
 
Corporate security development 
According to Heljaste, Korkiamäki, Laukkala, Mustonen, Peltonen & Vesterinen (2008) corpo-
rate security development is as any process in a company. It requires measurement, control 
and updating to ensure the effectiveness. The problem of achieving these goals is related to 
the vast area corporate security contains. Security activities and areas must be identified and 
developed systematically, and the results must be evaluated, in order to develop security in a 
meaningful and logical way to protect company’s assets from threats. (Heljaste, et al. 2008). 
 
As definition of corporate security above suggests, it is protection of a company’s core busi-
ness, but also an expenditure. Development consist of two factors: growing and changing as 
one, and becoming more advanced as another. The corporate security development is defined 
in this thesis as improving a service of which purpose is to protect and enable the core busi-
ness of a company at reasonable cost. 
 
Corporate security service 
In this thesis, corporate security is identified as a supportive service. In  other words, corpo-
rate security is practiced to contribute to the overall value of a company and its production, 
but is not the main business of a company. Corporate security service includes procedures and 
development projects which are executed by the security team. 
 
2.3 Case company 
 
This thesis was conducted in a real company based in Finland. The company could be de-
scribed as a multidisciplinary one which operates on multiple field of infrastructure providing 
consultancy and designing services. It has around 500 to 1000 employees. The main business is 
planning and consultant services. The work is mainly office work including some field work. 
The field work includes environments such as construction sites, roads and highways, high 
altitude locations and a variety of terrains. 
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The case company has appointed a security team which is responsible for corporate security 
service. The team had six members during the research and was responsible to the support 
service management team, which included the heads of support services. The team managed 
corporate security on different fields depending on the role of the team member. The opera-
tion of corporate security processes is also one of the team’s tasks. 
 
This thesis aims to research how to develop corporate security in a real case company. A dis-
closure agreement was made about the thesis between the case company and the author to 
protect the company’s economical and security related interests. The company offers an en-
vironment to research the phenomenon of corporate security development. The publicity of 
the case company is not crucial to the research. 
 
3 Methods 
 
This thesis was performed as a qualitative research. Interviews, observation and document 
analysis were conducted as research methods. In the work corporate security and develop-
ment of corporate security and the Capability Maturity Model Integration are defined and 
flexibly applied to the case company analysis. 
 
According to Marshall & Rossman (2011) a researcher can ask practical questions which aim to 
contribute to the possible solution of the existing problem. In this case, it is what the current 
level of corporate security is in the case company and how to improve it. A research is ex-
pected to generate information which is sufficient and appropriate to answer the research 
questions, and complies the validity and ethical standards. This is fulfilled by selecting the 
correct methods and describing the validity and ethical standards. (Marshall & Rossman 2011, 
55-61). 
 
Marshall & Rossman (2011, 55-61) refer to Crabtree and Miller, who state that qualitative re-
search is demonstrated in the Shiva’s circle of constructivist inquiry, as described in figure 2. 
In this circle the researcher has to follow the dance, and at the same time stay apart from it. 
The aim is not to look for an ultimate truth, but discover and interpret the phenomena. The 
researcher is challenging the incorrect consciousness and providing a more enlightened con-
sciousness (Marshall & Rossman 2011, cited in Crabtree and Miller 1992, 60). 
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The purpose was to use interviews and observation to collect information on the current state 
of the corporate security in the case company. This information is compared to the maturity 
model to figure out how the case company manages key processes. 
 
3.1 Interviews 
 
According to Brinkmann & Kvale (2015, 103-109) an interview is a specific context where new 
information is produced, that separates interviews from other methods. The writers (2015, 
103-109) divide interview in to four main aspects: interviewers, interviewees, bodies and the 
role of gestures as the most crucial part of a interview. This division is made to wake up the 
researcher’s attitude towards interviewing and to see the whole context, instead of just un-
derstanding the interview only as a knowledge production tool. 
 
The division and understanding of different context allows the interviewer to understand the 
impacts of his choices when conducting an interview. For example, the relation with the 
questions and the topic or the communication of the interviewee and the location, where the 
interview takes place, all have a correlation which impact to the results of the interview. 
These factors must be taken in to consideration when planning and executing interviews. 
(Brinkmann & Kvale 2015, 103-109). 
 
According to Marshall & Rossman (2011, 142-148) qualitative research uses in-depth inter-
views which should be distinguished e.g. from radio interview. In a radio interview the inter-
viewing is more focused to the width than the depth of the interview compared to a research 
Figure 2: Shiva’s circle of constructivist inquiry (Marshall & Rossman 2011, cited in Crabtree 
and Miller 1992, 60) 
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interview. In this thesis, the interviews are based on phenomenology. Marshall & Rossman 
(2011, 142-148) states that phenomenological interviews collect data through the experiences 
of the interviewee and from how one has understood his/her experiences about the phenom-
ena and developed his/her understanding of the phenomena. Miller and Glassner continue 
that this approach could open a path to the meanings the interviewees themselves give to 
their experiences and their social environment (Silverman 1998, 100). The aim is to get de-
scription of the phenomena through similar view of multiple interviewees (Marshall & 
Rossman 2011, 142-148). 
 
According to Marshall & Rossman (2011, 142-148) the interviewees are allowed to prepare for 
the interview, and the questions are sent forehand. The interviewer explains the general top-
ic to the interviewee and otherwise respects the answers and structure of the replies. This 
allows the interviewee to express his/her perspective on the phenomena as it is, and it is not 
affected by how the interviewer views the phenomena. Though the interviewer sets the topic 
and interfers as little as possible in to the interviewees’ answers, the writer may present fol-
low-up questions to make the interview more fruitful. An interview is often an intimate meet-
ing, and the interviewee might not want to reply with honesty or answers with uncertain re-
plies (Marshall & Rossman 2011, 142-148).  
 
The aim is to acquire qualitative information on how corporate security manifests in the case 
company. Personnel who at the time of the research were leading in the case company 
and/or participating security activities was the target group of the interviews. A couple of 
employees outside the daily corporate security management were interviewed to provide per-
spective on the corporate security service. 
 
3.1.1 Questions 
 
In total, there were 16 questions which are presented in Appendix 1. The questions were di-
vided in two sections: General questions and Process area questions. General questions aimed 
to gather general information, views on corporate security and the security culture in the 
company. Process area questions were specified according to the process areas and aimed to 
construct identifiable information on how equivalent the company is to the maturity model 
process areas. 
 
The questions were same for all of the interviewees, and the results were formed question by 
question, comparing all the answers of one question at a time. The relevant points were 
picked from the answers to form a conclusion to each question, which was then used to de-
fine the capability and the maturity of the case company.  
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3.1.2 Transcribe & Translation 
 
Since the case company’s official language is Finnish, the interviews were in Finnish. Accord-
ing to Marshall & Rossman (2011, 163-168) after transcribing or translation process the infor-
mation acquired through interviewing transfers from raw data to a processed one. There is an 
ethical responsibility whilst transcribing and translating. Spoken language varies vastly from 
the written one: the authors point out that people don’t speak in paragraphs or use signal 
punctuations while talking. The same problem occurs with emotions and visual motions when 
the records are transcribed. (Marshall & Rossman 2011, 163-168) 
 
The researcher must take in consideration how research participants are presented, how re-
spect towards their contribution is shown, and how to handle the incomplete parts of text, 
such as half sentences. The commentators recommend that the author should share the tran-
scriptions to the interviewee to confirm that the text carries the purpose and the intentions. 
(Marshall & Rossman 2011, 163-168). 
 
Due to the problems of interpretation, the translation from one language to another remains 
a complex process. The authors highlight the term ‘interpretation’ as the definitions and in-
tents of the world are easily mixed or miss interpreted. Nuances and punctuation from one 
language rarely translate to another. Using another translator than the researcher compli-
cates the interpretation significantly. (Marshall & Rossman 2011, 163-168). 
 
In this thesis, the interviews represent a significant source of information, especially related 
to the evaluation of process areas. The interviewees gave a picture on how well different lev-
els of the case company discuss corporate security issues and on the awareness of the top 
management. 
 
3.2 Observation 
 
According to Marshall & Rossman (2011, 137-141) observation is an essential part of qualita-
tive research. It is used to discover complex activities and relationships. When it is used with 
interviews, the researcher may verify information by comparing obtained information from 
interviews and observation. Observation means a systematic monitoring of the phenomena in 
the social setting. Crucial is to record the notifications. 
 
Marshall & Rossman (2011) continue that at the early stage the researching may be done from 
a broad perspective. After a while when the researchers starts to observe and discovers pat-
terns in activities and relationships, he may analyze them and focus the observation. (Mar-
shall & Rossman 2011, 137-141). Since the author of this thesis was employed by the case 
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company for more than a year, and having first hand access to the company’s core business, 
corporate security management and security culture, observation was a reasonable method to 
use. 
 
Of course, the effect of the researcher’s presence can be debated. Field work is an essential 
way to conduct qualitative research, although it’s not compulsory. As Baszanger and Dodier 
state, the objectivity is secured by remaining open to explore the presentations and norma-
tive expectations which people utilize in their interaction with others (Silverman 1998, 9). 
 
In order to scatter the researcher’s subjectivities, one must try to recognize his/her own as-
sumptions (Eskola & al. 1998, 17); noticing them enables fresh ideas and viewpoints. In this 
thesis, the problem of subjectivity was forestalled by making diary entries after important 
events related to corporate security. Such events were the security team meetings, security 
related seminars in the company, meetings with the company’s CSO or other members of the 
security team. A couple of general entries were formed to summarize recent events and phe-
nomena. In total, there were 25 entries made during the research period (Appendix 2). 
 
The method gave a thorough overview on the occurring events, but it has weaknesses. Obser-
vation is subjective and relies to what the researcher notices. Therefore, it doesn’t describe 
the whole situation comprehensively, because the researcher does not necessary have visibil-
ity to all corporate security related organs and the researcher may miss major issues. 
 
The results of the method may be used as a verifier to the information acquired through other 
methods. From this perspective, the observation contributed to the total evaluation of capa-
bility in the case company. It also provided information on pointing out ways to further de-
velop corporate security service, identify best practices for it and map how corporate securi-
ty service has been developed. 
 
3.3 Analyzing documents 
 
According to Marshall & Rossman (2011, 160-163) organizations and other entities create vari-
ous artifacts. Documents are one of those artifacts which have been particularly used in qual-
itative studies. Marshall & Rossman continue that the archival data are the routinely collect-
ed information of organizations about official events. 
 
If gathering and analyzing documents is decided to be used as one of the research methods, 
the records and information should be linked to the research question. Marshall & Rossman 
(2011, 160-163) state, that the researcher has to be cautious when gathering & analyzing the 
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documents, because the transparency of the meaning is not present and corroboration of the 
documents should be verified through other methods. 
 
In this thesis, documents created by the security team of the case company were used for 
two purpose. First, to validate the information obtained from the interviews and observation 
and secondly, to obtain via information for the capability and maturity evaluation. Marshall & 
Rossman (2011, 160-163) continue that while using documents, ethical consideration depends 
on the availability of the used material. The researcher should consider, whether there is a 
risk for an exposure or privacy violation. The more classified or private the documents are, 
the more the researcher has to think about the ethical side of the information. 
 
The security documents of the company add valuable information to the thesis. The docu-
ments contain the security team’s agendas and memoranda, process descriptions, policies, 
documentation from projects and memos. With access to the records, there was valuable in-
formation available that verified information obtained through other methods. 
 
The case company uses an intranet service, which can be accessed only by authorized per-
sons. Corporate security material has a limited access in the intranet, and it’s also used as a 
workspace to manage documents. During the research period, following documents in Table 1 
were analyzed. 
 
Year Document 
2013 Security workshop program & memo 
  
2014 Description of information security 
 information security guide for projects 
  
2015 Information security policy 
 Creating contingency plan memo 
 Process for identifying corporate security needs description 
  
2016 Corporate security policy 
 Corporate security objectives and metrics 
 Introduction of document classification  
 Security introduction training material 
 Incident management process description 
 Processes and duties of the CSO 
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2013-2017 Corporate security plan, 2014-2016 
 Security team memos, 2013-2016 
Table 1: Material used in document analysis 
 
3.4  Ethicality and reliability 
 
According to Kananen (2013, 177-181) a thesis conclusions have to be correct, reliable and 
credible as should be the results in all research. Kananen states that there are criteria which 
confirm validity and reliability of a thesis. This criteria represents measurement of the quality 
of the work, and it has been developed through the science and research process. (Kananen 
2013, 177-181) 
 
The information used in the thesis must be examined through objectivity. The thesis should 
be replicable, which means that the methods used must be explained (Kananen 2013, 177-
181). Scientific research is always public knowledge, and criticism towards the results must 
be practiced in order to overturn the researcher’s own conclusions. The thesis as a process 
aims to create new and most competent information (Kananen 2013, 177-181). 
 
The topic of corporate security itself is a wide area and offers countless research objects. By 
providing this thesis to the case company, the first limitation is encountered: the company’s 
main business and supportive operations. The modified CMMI model limits the research in to 
the ten process areas used in this thesis. With these research frames, it is possible to study 
the subject to a meaningful extent and create new and competent information. 
 
According to Kananen (2013, 177-181) information as itself is only data, but when it is pro-
cessed through correct methods the information results to creditable data. The information 
produced must be independent from factors such as economical or religious bonds. 
 
The chosen means provide enough raw data, which is then transformed to credible data 
through the methods. The independence of the information is safeguarded by following the 
ethical code of the thesis – any bias which tend to affect the study is blocked. (Kananen 2013, 
177-181). 
 
This thesis aims to be neutral and fulfill the above mentioned criteria. When working close to 
the subject the reliability is under increased pressure to be severed, and the author might 
develop blind spots or have a conscious or an unconscious bias towards the subject. According 
to Kananen (2013, 177-181) this phenomenon can be tackled by sufficient amount of docu-
mentation. 
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4 Structure of Capability Maturity Model Integration for services 
 
Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) is an evaluation model developed from capabil-
ity maturity model (CMM). CMM refers to process improvement approach based on a process 
model. CMMI was further developed by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) from CMM to 
improve the usability of maturity models (What is Capability Maturity Model? (CMM), 2016). 
 
There are three different types of evaluation versions from the model: Development, Service 
and Acquisition, out of which the Service model is utilized in this thesis. The purpose of CMMI 
is to improve organizational processes. It includes elements that are essential in order to ef-
fectively improve these. (What is Capability Maturity Model Integration? (CMMI), 2016). 
 
According to the CMMI for services (2010, 4) processes hold the system together and research-
ing the processes helps to guide business. Scalability and improving of the processes can be 
achieved through researching information within the processes. 
 
Structure of CMMI for services was developed to be compatible with the definition of service. 
The model contains in total 24 process areas, of which 16 are core process areas. One is a 
shared process area and seven are specific to the Capability Maturity Model Integration for 
services, including one additional area. In process development CMMI for services points out 
three critical dimensions of which organizations should focus to improve business. Those 
three are People, Procedures & Methods and Tools & Equipment, which are marked to the 
Figure 3. (CMMI for services 2010, 3, 4, 7, 8). 
 
 
Figure 3: CMMI – three critical dimensions (CMMI for services 2010, 4) 
 
The CMMI provides a workable platform for evaluate and offer development proposals. The 
model itself has a very strict line, whether, certain processes are defined as incomplete, per-
formed or managed: if there is even one sub-practice notwithstanding, the model ranks the 
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whole process area as incomplete. As a consequence, the strict evaluation of the model actu-
ally prevents the formation of a reasonable view on the current capability and maturity of the 
case company’s corporate security service. 
 
The illustration of the results would be too simplified, and would not serve the purpose of 
this thesis nor the future development. This problematic situation was resolved by giving cer-
tain numeric evaluation to all the sub-practices, and then the overall picture was assessed 
and ranked. Of course, both of these were conducted in the light of CMMI substance, without 
using the otherwise too strict ranking model. Finally, to assess the maturity level, all the re-
sults were then reflected in relation with the CMMI structure. 
 
4.1 Key components 
 
The CMMI has key components which define how the model functions. The main component is 
Process area. The process areas are managed with purpose statements, which describe the 
process area and the factors related to it. These areas are related to each other and this con-
nection is highlighted at the related process area section. 
 
Evaluation of a process area happens through specific and generic goals. These goals are 
achieved through specific and generic practices which are further divided to sub-practices. 
(CMMI for services 2010, 9-10). These components create a picture that helps the user to un-
derstand practices, processes, goals and informative parts. For their part, they describe im-
portant activities and measured targets/themes. The complex system is visualized in Figure 4: 
 
 
 Figure 4: Illustration of the CMMI components (CMMI for services 2010, 10) 
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4.2 Capability Maturity Model Integration for services process areas 
 
The model has 24 process areas, in which a service can be developed. Has a group of specific 
and generic practices. These practices have set goals according to which the processes capa-
bility and maturity are defined. During implementation of the model the process areas are 
developed, when all those goals are reached. 
 
Process area: Abbreviation: Process area: Abbreviation: 
Capacity and Availability 
Management 
(CAM) Process and Product 
Quality Assurance 
(PPQA) 
Causal Analysis and Reso-
lution 
(CAR Quantitative Work 
Management 
(QWM) 
Configuration Manage-
ment 
(CM) Requirements Man-
agement 
(REQM) 
Decision Analysis and 
Resolution 
(DAR) Risk Management (RSKM) 
Incident Resolution and 
Prevention 
(IRP) Supplier Agreement 
Management 
(SAM) 
Integrated Work Man-
agement 
(IWM) Service Continuity (SCON) 
Measurement and Analy-
sis 
(MA) Service Delivery (SD) 
Organizational Process 
Definition 
(OPD) Service System De-
velopment 
(SSD) 
Organizational Process 
Focus 
(OPF) 7 Service System 
Transition 
(SST) 
Organizational Perfor-
mance Management 
(OPM) Strategic Service 
Management 
(STSM) 
Organizational Process 
Performance 
(OPP) Work Monitoring and 
Control 
(WMC) 
Organizational Training  (OT) Work Planning (WP) 
Table 2: Process areas (CMMI for services 2010, 33-34) 
 
4.3 Understanding the Capability Maturity Model Integration 
 
There is no specific order of practices mentioned in the model, and it is up to the user to 
identify the desired performance. The model demands that there is a process that addresses 
service related practices. At this stage, the organization can track its processes, while they 
are mapped to process areas and further evolve or form processes according to the model. 
(CMMI for services 2010, 21). 
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CMMI uses an evolutionary level system that organizations can use to advance their services 
through developing processes. These levels may also be an outcome of evaluations. There are 
two available improvement paths which are called representations. An organization may im-
prove either process belonging to a particular process area or a group of process areas. On 
the other path organizations can improve a group of processes linked to each other by devel-
oping process areas one after another. The paths are then associated to the representations 
of levels, i.e. capability and maturity. These two level types are further described “continu-
ous” as “capability levels” and “staged” as “maturity levels”.  
 
To reach a particular level the organization must fulfill all the goals of a particular level of a 
process area. Both of the methods use the same essential contents, and an organization can 
improve their service through both representations. (CMMI for services 2010, 21, 22). In the 
Figure 5 below the focus of the representations of the CMMI is visualized. In the ‘Staged rep-
resentation’ the maturity levels are used to characterize the relation of the organization’s 
processes in general. ‘Continuous representation’ aims to characterize the state of the rela-
tion of the processes to an individual process area of the organization with capability levels. 
(CMMI for services 2010, 22). 
 
 
 
Both representations are very similar. The different dimension comes from the level evalua-
tion system. The capability/maturity dimensions form the benchmarking factors which will 
guide the organization’s development. 
 
Figure 5 : Continuous & Staged Representation (CMMI for services 2010, 22) 
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Capability and Maturity levels are measured separately. The capability levels measure devel-
opment of an individual process area, whereas the maturity levels concentrate in the devel-
opment of multiple process areas. The model uses a level evaluation scale from zero to five, 
out of which grades zero to three are capability levels, and one to five stand for maturity lev-
els as in Table 3.  
Level Continuous representation - 
Capability levels 
Staged representation -
Maturity levels 
Level 0 Incomplete  
Level 1 Performed Initial 
Level 2 Managed Managed 
Level 3 Defined Defined 
Level 4  Quantitatively Managed 
Level 5  Optimizing 
Table 3: Comparison of Capability and Maturity levels (CMMI for services 2010, 22) 
 
The continuous representation measures particular process area and the desired capability 
level. Staged representation evaluates multiple processes at once and focuses on the question 
if processes are being operated. That is why the starting level of maturity levels is Level one, 
Initial. However, the representations have different approach to the improvement: level two 
and three have the same definition on both dimensions. This is purposely set, since the same 
goals and practices are reflected in both of the representations. (CMMI for services 2010, 23). 
 
Understanding Capability Levels 
 
Capability levels define the level of a single process area. A capability level is achieved when 
generic goals of a certain level are fulfilled. Continuous representation of process area is 
measured with capability levels. The stages of capability levels are from zero to three, or in 
words, incomplete, performed, managed and defined. Process areas, which are not executed 
or they are not completely running, are defined as incomplete processes. 
 
Capability level requirements are presented in the following as they’re described by the 
CMMI. Since they were flexibly applied to the evaluation, they offered a fruitful and wide ap-
proach to security matters. And taking in consideration the general situation in the case com-
pany, Capability level 3 was noticed in the assessment, but never reached. 
 
Capability Level 0: Incomplete process is defined as: 
 Process is not performed or is only partially performed 
 Process areas have specific goals which have not been fulfilled 
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 No generic goals because it’s not reasonable to establish partially performed process 
 
Capability Level 1: Performed process is defined as: 
 Process is considered a performed one 
 The process produce work which fulfils the set specific goals of the process area 
 Capability level 1 is reached when the required processes of the process area are per-
formed 
 
On the next levels the process involves relevant stakeholders, and it’s executed according to 
a policy with a plan. Standardization of processes evolves constantly. Employees with re-
quired skills and adequate resources are responsible for monitoring, controlling, and review-
ing the process. The process is evaluated according to the description of the process. The 
preconditions for capability levels two and three are summarized below. (CMMI for services 
2010, 24-25). 
 
Capability Level 2: Managed process is defined as: 
 Performed process and planned process 
 Process follows a policy that indicates how it will be performed 
 Resources are provided 
 Responsibilities are assigned 
 Training to perform the process is provided 
 Selected work products related to performing the process are controlled 
 
Capability Level 3: Defined process is defined as: 
 The process is a managed process  
 The process area is tailored by organization’s tailoring guidelines 
 The process description is maintained 
 Process related assets are contributed to the organizational process assets 
 
Understanding Maturity levels 
 
Maturity levels are evaluated on process areas, which are predefined, and they consist of ge-
neric practices. The process areas aim to improve the organization’s overall performance. 
This performance can be characterized through maturity levels. An achieved maturity level 
sets important subset for the organization to achieve the next maturity level. The five ma-
turity levels are: 1. Initial, 2. Managed, 3. Defined, 4. Quantitatively Managed, 5. Optimizing. 
(CMMI for services 2010, 26). 
 
Maturity Level 1: Initial level processes are defined as: 
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 Usually ad hoc and chaotic 
 Lacking stable environment supporting the processes 
 Success depends on the competence of staff, not on established processes 
 Organization provides service which functions 
 Budget and schedule are often exceeded 
 Tendency to over commitment 
 Processes are abandoned in the time of crisis 
 Unable to repeat success 
 
Maturity Level 2: Managed level processes are defined as: 
 Organization is an effective service provider 
 Project and work management, support, and service establishment and delivery pro-
cesses are institutionalized 
 The process has service strategy, work plans, monitor and control procedures for the 
work to ensure the service delivery 
 Established customer agreements, management of customer requirements and con-
stant development of agreements 
 Process and product quality are institutionalized 
 Capability is measured and performance analyzed 
 Following objects are managed: work groups, work activities, processes, work prod-
ucts and services 
 The processes are planned according to the organization’s policy 
 Adequate resources are provided, responsibilities are assigned, training is given as 
needed to execute the process and work product match the required quality 
 Relevant stakeholders are identified and involved 
 The process is periodically monitored and controlled 
 Adherence and performance of the process is periodically evaluated and reviewed 
with senior management 
 
Maturity Level 3: Defined level processes are defined as: 
 Defined processes are used for managing work 
 Service continuity and incident resolution and prevention are part of the standard 
process set 
 Selected work products are verified to meet their requirements to validate the ser-
vice 
 The processes are understood and described in standards, procedures, tools, and 
methods 
 The organization’s set of standard processes, which are used to establish logical pro-
cesses across the organization, are created 
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 Work groups establish their defined processes by tailoring the organization’s set of 
standard processes according to tailoring guidelines 
 
Essential differences between the maturity levels two and three are the common stand-
ards on process descriptions and procedures, while on maturity level two the processes 
may have their own standards. Other major difference is the accuracy of obligatory de-
scriptions among maturity levels. The maturity level three especially requires: the pur-
pose, inputs, entry criteria, activities, roles, measures, verification steps, outputs and ex-
it criteria. (CMMI for services 2010, 27-28). 
 
Maturity Level 4: Quantitatively Managed level processes are defined as: 
 Quantitative objectives for quality and process performance 
 Base for the objectives is defined by the needs of the customer, end users, organiza-
tion and process implementers 
 The quality and performance of process is managed through process lifecycle and it is 
understood in statistical terms 
 Quantitative data from process performance of selected sub-processes is collected 
and analyzed  
 
The difference between the maturity levels three and four is that on the level four the pro-
cesses are managed by using statistical data and analyzing the quantitative data. This partial-
ly predicts how the process will perform. 
 
Maturity Level 5: Optimizing level processes are defined as: 
 Processes are continually improved 
 Business objectives and performance needs are understood 
 Variation in the processes and the process outcome are understood from the perspec-
tive of quantitative data 
 Continuous process improvement through incremental and innovative process and 
technological improvements 
 Quality and process performance objectives are established according to the organi-
zational standards 
 Processes are revised periodically to reflect changes in business objectives or in or-
ganizational performance 
 Measurement is conducted to deploy process improvements and their effects 
 Statistical and other quantitative techniques are used and compared to quality and 
process performance objectives 
 Target stage is to have defined processes, organization’s set of standard processes, 
and supporting technology which are measured 
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The difference between the levels four and five is related to the progress of organizational 
improvement. On level four the improvement focuses on the sub-processes, while on level 
five the focus falls on the overall performance of the organization. 
 
In a wider picture, improvement happens when requirements on single process areas are ful-
filled. Maturity level advances mark the assumption of quality in the work. As an example, 
work on maturity level one is ad hoc, whereas on level two the work is managed via a planned 
procedure, and the required resources are available. (CMMI for Services 2010, 28-30). 
 
4.4 Viewing process areas & relations of processes 
 
Process areas are viewed differently depending on the representation. The continuous repre-
sentation helps to develop singular selected process areas within the process area. When 
looking at the staged representation, it shows which process areas should be developed in 
order to achieve the next maturity level. It’s important to note that if the maturity level of a 
certain process area needs to be evolved, then the associated process areas must also be tak-
en in to consideration. The continuous representation divides process areas in four catego-
ries: Process Management, Project & Work Management, Service Establishment & Delivery and 
Support. The categories are used to highlight the relations of the process areas, and they help 
to shape their development. 
 
When an organization wants to evolve, it has two possibilities. Either focus on development 
on singular process area to achieve higher capability level, or to develop multiple process ar-
eas simultaneously to reach higher maturity level. The evolution is done with target profiles. 
These target profiles consist of the selected process areas and of the desired capability and 
maturity levels. The target profiles are later on arranged in to a order which is called target 
staging. This helps the organization to plan and manage the development process. (CMMI for 
service, 2010, 32). 
  
 
 
 Figure 6: Continuous & Staged preview (CMMI for service, 2010, 32) 
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The model uses generic goals and practices to define the continuous level of a process area. 
The aim is to institutionalize generic practices in order to ensure that the practices are exe-
cuted effectively. Generic practices portray the institutionalization through executed activi-
ties. The level of institutionalization is described according to achieved generic goals as in 
Table 4. 
 
Generic 
Goal level 
Progression of pro-
cesses 
Generic Practices by generic goal level 
GG 1 Performed process GP 1.1 Perform Specific Practices  
GG 2 Managed process GP 2.1 Establish an Organizational Policy  
GP 2.2 Plan the Process  
GP 2.3 Provide Resources  
GP 2.4 Assign Responsibility  
GP 2.5 Train People  
GP 2.6 Control Work Products  
GP 2.7 Identify and Involve Relevant Stakeholders 
GP 2.8 Monitor and Control the Process  
GP 2.9 Objectively Evaluate Adherence  
GP 2.10 Review Status with Higher Level Management  
GG 3 Defined process GP 3.1 Establish a Defined Process  
GP 3.2 Collect Process Related Experiences  
Table 4: Generic Goals & Practices (CMMI for service, 2010, 57) 
 
Following description explains the institutionalization of process progression. Generic goals 
are contented according to how generic practices are fulfilled. (CMMI for service, 2010, 57, 
60). 
 
Performed process 
A performed process accomplishes the minimum requirements to satisfy specific goals of the 
process area. (CMMI for service, 2010, 57) 
 
Generic goals for performed process area:  
 Achieving the specific goals of the process area 
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Managed process 
A managed process is a performed process which is “planned and executed in accordance with 
policy; employs skilled people having adequate resources to produce controlled outputs; in-
volves relevant stakeholders; is monitored, controlled, and reviewed; and is evaluated for 
adherence to its process description.” (CMMI for service 2010, 58). 
 
The process can be institutionalized by an organizational actor. Specific objectives such as 
cost, schedule, and quality are institutionalized & defined by the management of the process. 
When a managed process is controlled, it acquires resilience in state of stress. The organiza-
tion is responsible to establish the requirements and objectives of the process. The service is 
available for inspection by management at specified points, for example at milestones or at 
the completion of a project. Commitment of the staff working with the process and stake-
holders is necessary. The labor productions must be controlled and reviewed with relevant 
stakeholders. The service is required to satisfy its specified requirements. (CMMI for service 
2010, 58). 
 
Generic goals for managed process area:  
 Manage the execution of processes associated with the process area 
 The process is performed according to an existing policy 
 The process is performed by a plan 
 Resources are provided 
 Responsible personnel are assigned 
 Personnel executing are trained to perform it 
 Services from providing the process are controlled 
In other words, the process is planned and monitored. (CMMI for service 2010, 59). 
 
Defined process 
The CMMI defines a defined process as following: “A defined process is a managed process 
that is tailored from the organization’s set of standard processes according to the organiza-
tion’s tailoring guidelines; has a maintained process description; and contributes process re-
lated experiences to the organizational process assets”. (CMMI for service 2010, 58). A de-
fined process encompasses following factors: purpose, inputs, entry criteria, activities, roles, 
measures, verification steps, outputs and exit criteria. 
 
Articles which are used to describe implementing and improving processes are called organi-
zational process assets. The articles are results of the organization’s investments which are 
expected to create value; they can be identified as assets. The organization holds set of 
standard processes. Those processes are the basis for defined processes, and are expected to 
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improve over time and describe the relation between process elements. A defined process has 
two generic goals which are shown below. (CMMI for service 2010, 58). 
 
Generic goals for a defined process area:  
 Existing organizational standard process which can be tailored to be used in different 
process areas. 
 Using the standard process may not need changes in order to work 
 
Relations of the processes 
 
There are several factors which separate a performed process, a managed process and the 
defined one. First of all, it is the extent of the management. Managed processes have a plan, 
they are executed by that plan and they achieve the objectives, while the process is institu-
tionalized for consequent performance. A performed process only achieves specific goals of a 
process area. The distinction between a managed and a defined process is that the defined 
process has a broader scope in the description of the process, such as the standards and pro-
cedures. (CMMI for service 2010, 58, 59). 
 
The managed processes are not as detailed, and do not manifest as punctually. The defined 
processes are better managed, because they produce information about the interrelationships 
of the process activities. This provides information on the detailed measures of the process 
and on the service. The processes evolve according achieved generic goals. Generic goals also 
describe the processes and mark the phase of institutionalization of the evolving processes 
from a performed towards a defined one. (CMMI for service 2010, 58, 59). 
 
4.5 Optimizing process areas 
 
In this thesis, the modified CMMI is used to evaluate the maturity of the case company’s cor-
porate security and to outline development proposals. Since CMMI carries a software devel-
opment approach, and considering the size of the corporate security service in the case com-
pany, the use of all the process areas was unnecessary. With the company’s CSO we decided 
to use ten process areas to evaluate the maturity and capability of the corporate security ser-
vice. 
 
As already explained in Chapter 3, the maturity assessment is based on the vast research da-
ta. This enables further discussion and reflection about the case company’s development 
needs. The evaluation itself was conducted with numerical scaling to simplify the whole pro-
cess. The generic goals and generic practices were evaluated individually according to the 
CMMI as incomplete, performed or managed. 
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Hence the tripartite scale would only lead to an apparently cruel distinction between the lev-
els, bypassing the development/trends within them, an intra-level analysis was conducted 
too. As previously explained, the generic goals contain generic practices which are the same 
in every process area, while the specific goals contain specific practices that vary according 
to the process area. Judging by the results obtained, none of the process areas reached Ma-
turity level three, so it does not exist in table diagrams nor in results. Nevertheless, to give a 
comprehensive picture of the Maturity levels and components belonging to them, they are all 
introduced below. 
 
Maturity level 1 “Initial” 
 No components 
 
Maturity level 2 “Managed” process areas 
 Measurement and analysis 
 Process and product quality assurance 
 Supplier agreement management 
 Work monitoring and control 
 Work planning 
 
Maturity level 3 “Defined” process areas 
 Capability and Availability Management 
 Incident Resolution and Prevention 
 Integrated Work Management 
 Organizational Process Definition 
 Risk Management 
 
Maturity level 4 “Quantitatively Managed” process areas 
 Organizational process performance 
 Quantitative work management 
 
Maturity level 5 “Optimizing” process areas 
 Casual analysis and resolution 
 Organizational performance management. 
 
5 Results 
 
The results of this thesis are obtained through the used methods. The interviews, case com-
pany’s artifacts and observation together form an information basis. It was then compared to 
the process areas and maturity model evaluation, although the results gave more substance 
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to the security management point of view. The observation gave more information related to 
the Capability and Maturity evaluation, because the performed processes and activities were 
under the monitoring, and could later on be compared to the requirements of the CMMI. 
 
One aspect was to evaluate the impact of security development to the business. This is be-
cause security is a supportive action and not the main business itself. Documentation analysis 
gave sight on the whole development arch of corporate security and on how corporate securi-
ty service is executed in the case company. 
 
The interview results are presented first, and then the summaries of answers to the questions 
are introduced. Secondly, the results of documentation analysis are shown. Thirdly, the find-
ings of observations are presented. To conclude, CMMI results are presented combining some 
of the results obtained through other research methods.  
 
5.1 Interviews 
 
Background of the interviewees varied a lot. All the interviewees were at least heads of de-
partment, members of the security team or the top management. Ten out of twelve had work 
experience with security before their current position. The longest service period in the case 
company among the interviewees was sixteen years, and at the shortest a year. The average 
service year was seven and two months by the time the interviews were recorded. Four of the 
interviewees represented the top management, and eight the middle management. 
 
Table 5: Educational background of interviewees 
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5.1.1 Definition of corporate security 
 
When asked to describe corporate security, all of the interviewees used relatively short defi-
nitions. All of the interviewees mentioned key terms which could be divided into 18 security 
related categories, and the four most mentioned topics were: Estate, Functions, Information 
and Personnel. The result reflects, what the interviewees see as important topics related to 
corporate security. 
To summarize, the physical location where the actual work happens, has a big priority. Well 
managed estates are important to enable efficient work. However, estate security is a rela-
tively traditional and passive security, which indicates that the case company is still in the 
beginning of steps to develop security. On the other hand, considering the field where the 
case company works, there are not many other major disruption factors to the basic work 
than offices which cannot be utilized. 
Information relates to all information security mentioned. It is another key factor of the 
company, and the majority of the work is consultation and produced with computers. The 
company has to maintain a relatively big information technology infrastructure. It’s no sur-
prise that information is mentioned by most of the interviewees.  
 
Functions relate to security functions which are operated in the case company. Security func-
tions is a difficult term, since every interviewee has his/her own idea about the specific secu-
Table 6: What is corporate security? 
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rity function. Generally, it can be understood to indicate that the interviewees recognize the 
existence and the importance of corporate security. 
Personnel was one of the most mentioned topics and it is a major asset for the company. The 
well-being and safety of the personnel is a set priority which can be explained due to the na-
ture of the company’s core business.  
What sticks out, is what is absent. E.g. Risk management was relatively often mentioned 
throughout some of the interviews, but it is remarkable that no one mentioned it when de-
scribing corporate security. Concepts such as Continuity, Product safety and Reputation were 
mentioned, but they did not stand out as popular. One could say that they are more specific 
categories than the four most commonly mentioned. After all, the data shows that the overall 
understanding of security is somewhat evolved.  
Since corporate security can be defined very widely, the key terms were used to form a table 
(Table 6) which demonstrate how widely or similarly the interviewees highlight different ele-
ments of corporate security. Overall, the answers were coherent indicating that the inter-
viewees have similar understanding on what corporate security is, though some answers 
where relatively short and less informative. It’s also worth mentioning that the comprehen-
siveness of corporate security was mentioned only by a few interviewees. Yet, most of the 
interviewees recognized the scale of the topic.  
5.1.2 Corporate security responsibilities 
 
The responsibilities structure of security management seems to be well acknowledged. The 
awareness on how responsibility is divided among the whole organization seems to be rela-
tively narrow.  
 
Table 7: Responsible for security 
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CEO and CSO were much more often named as responsible for security compared to every 
employee or executive team. This resonates with the idea of knowing who is responsible in 
organizational structure, but misses the substance of responsibility. Indeed, the CEO and CSO 
are the responsible ones, if there is a major incident followed by a prosecution. The ordinary 
employee still has the responsibility to follow security guidelines.  
5.1.3 Corporate security in business 
 
The position of the interviewees shaped the answers heavily. A clear trend is that corporate 
security has become more present than earlier. The commitment of the top management was 
seen as the leading sign to develop corporate security. 
 
The security management system was established, and a unified thinking on corporate securi-
ty was emerging. The overall security remains somewhat absent. The possibilities of corpo-
rate security is recognized by some of the interviewees, pointing out that it is not only per-
formed to tackle problems, but it also may help to take controlled risks. 
 
Practical examples on how corporate security influences the business are mentioned: Guide-
lines, Occupational Health & Safety gear, Risk Management and Commute Travel Safety to 
name a few. Security activities and requirements have also been increasing for most of the 
mentioned aspects are more supportive services than business fields. 
 
Some of the interviewees had difficulties recognizing corporate security’s impact to business. 
One interviewee took up the customers’ point of view and named reliability, quality and good 
service as the outcome of the case company’s security measures. Risk management was 
brought up as an important factor, since the business risks were relatively often assessed.  
 
In general, the employees were clearly becoming more informed about corporate security, 
and security issues seemed to be better managed in the project work. Some interviewees 
seemed to trust that employees were well aware of the security guidelines and followed 
them. It seems that there are various security methods in use among different sub-industries, 
which are nonetheless supervised by the security team.  
 
There were clearly two opinions on the visibility of corporate security. One wished that it 
could be more visible in the daily operations, because the overall security management was 
less visible. Corporate security was also seen as a restrictive thing in a positive light from the 
support service’s point of view, but not every employee see it positively. One thought was 
that when it is not visible, but still present, it would be ideal. There were also opinions that 
the business should not be disrupted too much by the security measures. 
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5.2 Observations & documentation analysis 
 
The corporation security functions were monitored throughout the year 2016, while documen-
tation analysis consisted of material from 2013 to 2016. The observation and documentation 
analysis were combined in the results section. Since these methods produced similar results, 
it was reasonable to handle both in the same chapter. 
 
The combined analysis offered a suitable information to generate an overall picture. On one 
hand, the documents conserve a general history of corporate security matters. On the other, 
especially the security team meeting memoranda provided a informative source to verify the 
corporate security service procedures. The documents also brought additional information for 
comparison of the company’s current state to the requirements of the maturity model. Ob-
servation worked as a verification tool. It is notable that observation was applied only in 2016 
to security team meetings. 
 
The company has a functioning information management system regarding security manage-
ment. It has somewhat messy structure, even though many important documents were main-
tained, and they contained valuable information. During the observation the amount of secu-
rity related memoranda and saved documents grew. This indicates recent tendencies of cor-
porate security development, e.g. serious efforts to consolidate corporate security can be 
noticed from the emerge of information security policy & the Corporate security policies. 
 
5.2.1 Awakening of security issues  
 
The beginning of corporate security development dates back to the year 2013. A security 
workshop was held at the beginning of November 2013. Background information for the work-
shop states: 
 There is no regular security system 
 There is no well-organized security team 
 Security mapping is needed 
 Establishment of corporate security development plan 
 Eleven point program 
 
The top management and stakeholder group representatives were comprehensively present in 
the workshop. In the workshop, it became clear that the case company had to take a stand on 
corporate security issues. The basic elements of the corporate security were agreed, a corpo-
rate security team was established and the first security metrics were established, including 
ten measurable points with a scaling ‘executed’ / ‘not executed’. 
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After the workshop, the corporate security team held its first meeting in December 2013. The 
basic corporate security responsibilities were assigned, the corporate security team was es-
tablished and other security relative issues were discussed. These comprised document classi-
fication issues, work habits of the corporate security team  and security incidents. Further-
more, starting from 2013 a security plan is drafted and executed annually. 
 
Year 2014 had a heavy emphasis on practical security & information security. Topics, that 
occur in the documents, were for example creation of information security policy, composing 
security attachments and mapping information security threats. An information security de-
scription, including several components, was formed alike, while information security instruc-
tions were set to be drafted. 
 
From the memoranda of the security team it can be noticed that the security development 
focused vastly on practical corporate security. This trend was obvious, because 2014 was the 
first full year of corporate security development. During this period the working habits of the 
security team started to form. As a testimony for the enlargement (and an increasing under-
standing?) of corporate security, in 2014 risk management, contingency planning, crisis man-
agement and security policy were all added to the yearly security plan. 
 
Throughout the following years security plans were seemingly better established, having dif-
ferent security sections named, and development objectives set underneath. Still, the accent 
fell mostly into information security. Overall, 2015 became the year of establishing the corpo-
rate security service, defining key procedures and binding relations with key stakeholders. 
Notable is the decrease in the amount of security team meetings, from nine to six during the 
year. 
 
The establishing of the service and indistinct working methods probably explain the decrease 
in the amount of meetings. Two remarkable things also rise from the documentation of 2015. 
For the first time since the security workshop in 2013, security metrics are mentioned in the 
security plan for the year 2016, and a memo is composed to establish a contingency plan. 
During the observations, security metrics were a well discussed theme, however, the decision 
making on the subject stumbled. 
 
5.2.2 Major corporate security development 
 
Year 2016 brought the institutionalization of corporate security service. The new corporate 
security policy entered into force, but required harmonizing in security issues. This policy de-
fined objectives, principles, roles, responsibilities, security aims and metrics of corporate 
security. It had a stand on risk assessment, follow-up and surveillance. Process for identifying 
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corporate security needs description was created to help the security team to topple the 
problem of individuals giving subjective descriptions of the case company’s corporate security 
settings. The team was also worried about security incidents which never came to the team’s 
awareness, or about customer requests to business concerning corporate security, which ei-
ther were described by the employees themselves or were brought to attention just slightly 
before the return date. 
 
At the first quarter of the year there were major events such as the risk workshops, changes 
in the security team personnel. After a relatively busy spring a new CSO was appointed in 
June. The autumn started with the handling of several security incidents and an ad hoc re-
quest from top management. Towards the end of the year security management improved, as 
can be observed from the security team meeting topics and decisions. The last entry from 
December summarise the then state of corporate security and points out development needs. 
It also records the CSO’s desire for additional resources to corporate security work. 
 
With an outside service provider the case company initiated risk management process during 
the spring of 2016. It consisted of workshops and a risk management tool. Considering the 
commitment to the risk management process it can be said that the case company took an 
enormous step within this area, although the workshop handled broader topics than corporate 
security. From the observation it rises that the initiation of risk seminars is related to the 
company’s objective to achieve a quality standard, i.e. the lever balances between the 
pragmatic approach and voluntary willingness of the top management to improve corporate 
security. The top management approach was a pragmatic one, which saw the quality standard 
as an external standing order. There remained at least one continuous reason to initiate and 
upkeep the risk management process. Certain members of the security team felt that this 
workshop didn’t provide much information about risks of their own field, and that the process 
should be deployed to lower levels in order to meet the corporate security needs.  
 
Security metrics, which was another visible development area, was much more detailed for 
the upcoming year 2017. It included four categories with nine subcategories to be measured. 
Additionally, a few numerical metrics were established for the first time. The metrics were 
further developed throughout the year. The development of the metrics were not progressing 
due to lack of attention and the mutual expectations of the top management and security 
team. There were also unclearness in the roles of single employees and even organs. E.g. 
there was a decision that the Support Services Management Team (SSMT) would start to fol-
low a security metric which was already being followed by the security team. While observ-
ing, this was a sort of managerial problem. A singular metric was addressed, instead of ad-
vancing the whole security measurement. 
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5.2.3 Everyday corporate security 
 
Since 2014 the case company had been arranging security trainings to new employees, and 
during the early stages of the year 2016 the training material was reviewed and updated. The 
new version included five sections: Security objectives of the company, Estate safety & secu-
rity, Information security, Emergency procedures and Acquiring security assistance. The secu-
rity management system itself had a general description, but the smaller elements were not 
defined as well. 
 
Incident management had been developed vastly since the second half of the year 2015, and 
this materialized into an Incident management process description. The security team memo-
randa clearly demonstrate an annual growth in the amount of reported and handled incidents. 
The increase in the awareness of incident management, recording of incidents reported orally 
or via other unofficial means, and the change in perception of an incident can be named as 
reasons for the upward trend. Nonetheless, there were still incidents which did not reach the 
attention of the corporate security team. 
 
During the second quarter of the year 2016 the security team had personnel changes, includ-
ing the Chief Security Officer. This affected the work of the security team, and it was decid-
ed that the security team will not be summoned until the new CSO is appointed. This gener-
ated a serious question: Who will substitute the CSO? Recruitment of a new CSO was initiated 
soon after the incumbent resigned, and as an advantage of this period was that the duties and 
processes of the CSO were defined. By the end of the year the security activities were again 
managed properly. 
 
The documentation classification had for a long time been under formation alike. The top 
management and the security team had long discussed the issue, but little progress was 
achieved. During the year 2016 the need for the documentation classification procedures 
grew, and an introductive guideline was formed. The document classification was not taken 
into use during the research period. It remains a question whether a document classification 
procedure is established. 
 
During 2016 the security team had five meetings. The still decreasing trend of security team 
meetings can be explained by the personnel changes. Thus, the information was more fruit-
ful. Throughout the year document classification was a discussed topic, escalating to a top 
management request to deliver a functioning process description by the end of the year. This 
was due to a customer request, and this kind of security development pictures well how cor-
porate security is being developed in the case company. Again, corporate security develop-
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ment is not high on priorities until a customer demand is presented. Only then, the top man-
agement activates and requires the security team to respond to the respective case. 
 
Though the harsh expression, in turn the top management is open for the corporate security 
development outside the active needs. This may indicate that the additional value and need 
for corporate security are recognized in the top management. Albeit willing, the top man-
agement was more pragmatic to develop corporate security. It also had doubts about the im-
portance of corporate security development and its role. It seems that Leppänen is right 
when he depicts the pragmatic, even cynical, ownership perspective on corporate security. 
The security team was more aware of the deficiencies of the corporate security and had a 
better vision of the development, but were lacking resources and the top management’s en-
gagement. 
 
An outside occupational health & safety inspection was executed to one of the county offices 
of the case company by respective officials. The inspection itself went well, but it woke con-
fusion in the security team’s responsibilities, relating to who represents the occupational 
health & safety manager in the case company. Though inconsistent, is a minor one, yet it un-
derlines need for a clearer division of labor. 
 
6 CMMI 
 
The process areas were evaluated by the author and the Chief Security Officer. The author’s 
answers are based on used research methods, while the CSO’s evaluation bases on his own 
experience, and was acquired to have a reflective view on how the case company performs. 
The CSO’s task is a key position, enabling the best view to understand corporate security, and 
the opinions of the CSO gave valuable comparative information. 
 
The results of both generic and specific goals were formed through a grading system. First, 
the specific practices were evaluated as executed/non-executed. Later, the overall amount 
of executed VS non-executed practices were summed up, and this defined if a generic or spe-
cific goal is complete (or in numbers 2), partially complete (1), or incomplete (0). Then the 
summary of graded goals were divided by the amount of the goals, which gave the final grade 
for the total process area. The final grades are rounded, and differ a little bit, hence the 
amount of specific goals varies between the process areas, whilst every process area has the 
same amount of generic goals (Appendix 4). 
 
Every generic practice of each process area was evaluated one by one and given a numeric 
grade. Of course, to keep it reasonable, only fractions that can be divided with three (round-
ed as 0,3 and 0,7…) were applied to. Apart from serving the purpose of the thesis better, the 
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intra-level analysis gave a more realistic insight to the process areas themselves. For exam-
ple, even in the case of a fair progress in regards to specific practices, the process area as a 
whole might still not rank high. As in the case of Process and Product Quality Assurance, even 
with 4/4/2 completed generic practices of the generic goal 2, the final grade resulted in 0,6. 
 
The maturity evaluation was then formed from the assessment of the capability evaluation 
compared to the entire research data. The evaluations were made in December 2016 and 
January 2017. An advantage of this was that the CSO was appointed recently and possessed a 
rather critical attitude. 
 
The evaluation of the Chief Security Officer and the author somewhat crossed, but in general 
the evaluations were convergent. The CSO had a slightly positive evaluation, while the author 
evaluated some process areas being more established and others less established. This could 
be explained by the period of time the two had been working with corporate security. Also, 
the work experience should not be underestimated pointing out that the CSO has previous 
experience from conducting quality evaluations. Likewise, the CSO had the main responsibil-
ity for corporate security, and a better vision on the overall situation. The author’s experi-
ence about corporate security, though working with corporate security as his main task, may 
have been closer to a service user’s position. 
 
6.1 Capability & Maturity level 
 
From the Capability’s point of view, the case company is “performing” on all the measured 
process areas. However, the sophistication of the operations varies, and each process area is 
more precisely discussed below. On average, Capability level of the case company resulted in 
1 or “Initial”. 
 
When it comes to Maturity, the company usually entrenches level 1 - “Initial”. Yet, the fol-
lowing Maturity is reached only when all the components surpass the earlier level. In this 
case, there’s a minor question, which one of the estimates about Process and Product Quality 
Assurance better reflects the reality.  
 
Whilst speaking of Maturity level three components, certainly two of them obtained Maturity 
level “Initial”. At three process areas there’s a notable discrepancy between the author’s and 
the CSO’s opinions. The most striking result is the imminently low grade of Risk Management 
component. The main reason for this could be that the process was initiated only in 2016. 
Also, the process was prevalently launched for the use of top management, and it remains 
open if the security team can utilize the process. The deeper discussion follows after Maturity 
level 2 analysis. 
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6.2 Maturity level 2 process areas 
 
Measurement and analysis 
As seen in the Table eight, Measurement and Analysis lies in the initial stage in the case com-
pany. There were some security metrics in use, and they were well organized, defined and 
had a person assigned to look up on.  
 
During the research period the need for an established security metrics was addressed multi-
ple times by the middle management. Some important security related functions were meas-
ured, but the lack of decision making prevented establishing clear security metrics. The visi-
bility of current metrics was feeble outside of the corporate security team. This explains why 
Measurement and Analysis stays around the level “Initial”. 
 
Process and product quality assurance 
There occurred dispersion in the interview results on, whether there are corporate security 
quality requirements and on who establishes them. It was clear that there were a few corpo-
rate security quality requirements. The requirements often were based on executed/not exe-
cuted -principle. 
 
Active security processes were mainly maintained by the security team and the quality assur-
ance was decided by the acting person or security team. Though, this seemed to be a good 
practice when taking in to consideration the size of the security team and the number of dif-
ferent functions. Needless to say, quality requirements which are based on well-established 
metrics, serve better in the long run.  
 
Table 8: Maturity level 2 process areas 
 45 
Supplier agreement management 
Supplier agreement management was well organized in the company. There were named re-
sponsible persons which worked on their own field. The overall picture from security related 
document management seems to be blurry to the CSO which could be partly explained by the 
autonomous agreement management of the security team members. This culture was estab-
lished in the case company already before the significance of corporate security became evi-
dent. During the research the author was not able to reach a process definition about supplier 
agreement management. 
 
Work monitoring and control & Work planning 
Not surprisingly, Work monitoring and control & Work planning were among the best graded 
process areas. This could be explained by their relation to the security team and its autono-
mous work. Work planning and monitoring were mostly performed within the security team 
which enabled a relatively smooth handling of procedures. 
 
Judging by all the research methods, there were yearly plans made by the security team aim-
ing to develop corporate security, the plans were discussed and accepted by certain instances 
and deviations from the plan were reacted with agreed measures. Work monitoring and con-
trolling & Work planning were recognized as important elements by the employees. 
 
6.3 Maturity level 3 process areas 
 
Capability and Availability Management 
The most striking difference between the author’s and the CSO’s view occurred in regards to 
Capability and Availability Management. The first described this process area as incomplete, 
whereas the latter had an overwhelmingly better picture on the function. The author’s view 
Table 9: Maturity level 3 process areas 
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bases on the interview results which were rather obscure even though  the availability of cor-
porate security services was generally recognized by most of the participants. 
 
Capability of corporate security was instead less recognized and occasionally linked to crisis 
scenarios. This is partly true, but does not respond to the recognition of the daily capability. 
One of the interviewee pondered if there was enough demand for corporate security and 
what would be its favorable level in order to provide for a permanent corporate security ca-
pability. 
 
Incident resolution and prevention 
This process area gave twofold results. On one hand, the case company had evolved in inci-
dent management. The handling of incidents shifted from an “ad hoc” case-handling in to a 
more consistent, organized and far seeing procedure. The development of security incident 
management was one of the first jobs of the author in the case company. 
 
On the other hand, the process was not yet institutionalized, there was no responsible person 
appointed for the process, and some of the incidents were still dealt with in different in-
stances. A definition of any incidents had not been drafted. 
 
Integrated work management 
There’s no remarkable dispersion in the opinions on IWM. Corporate security is seen to be 
substantially integrated with all the other functions, even intertwined. The security team’s 
normal tasks are not an obstacle for security matters, and vice versa. 
 
Thus, the integration is not totally completed, e.g. the project organization and the security 
one are still functioning separately. Of course, the latter supports the business with incident 
handling, challenges and via training. The ultimate goal – a corporate security that affects 
through the linear organization – remains to be reached. 
 
Organizational process definition 
Defining processes is clearly unfinished. It’s worth mentioning that the view of the author and 
the CSO differed a lot. The first described this process area as incomplete, whereas the latter 
had a seemingly better picture on Organizational Process Definition. One explanation can be 
found in the experiences of the two: the CSO was appointed during the research period and 
he had to familiarize himself with the process descriptions in use, whereas the trainee had a 
longer understanding on various procedures and descriptions. 
  
In the broader picture, the corporate security core components have indeed been identified 
and established, but scaling from top to down for more detailed processes, the functions lack 
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an accurate description. The functions are working with routine and are based on verbal 
agreement. Then again, it is not a big problem, since the security organization is small, rela-
tively new and personnel changes are not common. 
 
Risk management 
The lowest grades were given to Risk Management. It was also the most controversial topic 
considering the development of risk management in the case company. During the research a 
major risk analysis was conducted, and the author participated. 
 
Risk Management was activated in the case company by the top management during the re-
search period. The process was taken in use by the top management, which manifested itself 
during the risk assessment procedure. Since it was executed on a strategical level (and not on 
the everyday one), the assessed risks were high-level risks. Understandably, the lower level 
risks were not noticed, but as a consequence, the concerns of security team were more or 
less left aside. 
 
The implementation of the risk management plans or intentions in lower levels remained un-
clear till the end of the research. Seemingly some of the top management interviewees con-
sidered it a good idea to direct risk management on certain support service areas. Decisions 
of analyzing risks within key business processes remained ambiguous to the author alike. 
 
7 Development proposals 
 
After 2013 no workshops has been held. Another security workshop could be a good event to 
summarize the development during the past years, and to decide the next goals to be 
achieved in the field of corporate security. 
 
The case company has no comprehensive contingency plan. Contingency plan is a critical el-
ement during the time of crisis, and it enables faster and planned recovery for business oper-
ation. The case company had planned to have their first contingency plan ready during 2017. 
In order to have the contingency plan ready, the company must initiate risk measurements on 
its core business operations and key support services. 
 The company’s corporate security team should form a discussion platform between 
the corporate security team and the business elements in order to enforce implemen-
tation of security procedures inside the company and enhance the security culture in 
the company. 
 Corporate security year clock 
 List of documents, which must be updated periodically 
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The case company has created necessary guidelines to some of its operation areas. However, 
the deployment of the guidelines and responsibilities to managerial level employees has not 
been completed. 
 Develop processes how to implement security practices to the employees.  
 Produce a basic guide for management employees how to deal with security issues. 
 
7.1 Responsibilities & Strategy 
 
Responsibilities in the case company has been defined on the level of security policy, and the 
top management and security team are aware of their responsibilities. But based on the in-
terviews and observation, the top management is only partially committed to develop corpo-
rate security. The top management’s awareness of corporate security needs to be augment-
ed, particularly on how to perceive, measure and execute corporate security. The security 
team hankers after a broader involvement from the top management and interest groups. 
Hence, the top management should define the objectives and metrics for corporate security 
based on the risk management and strategy; and then assign the objectives to the security 
team which in return will give the top management further input on what is the corporate 
security situation and how it is developing. 
 
The case company’s corporate security strategy is based on the effectual security policy and 
strategic level risk assessment which is a continuous process. The next step would be to cre-
ate a strategy based on the risk assessments. Metrics should concern the most significant risks 
in order to monitor their evolution. A problem is that the top management has only one secu-
rity related metrics in the top management metrics. The target goals of corporate security 
and how to achieve them should be considered. Those target goals could for example be: 
 Valid contingency plan 
 Information security aware personnel  
 The target risk level of significant risks 
 Implementing security management to the top and middle management 
 Better understanding of the market situation  
 Insuring competence in most significant projects  
 
The top management should consider increasing its visibility in the security team. This could 
be done by having a member of the top management participating the security team meetings 
once or twice a year. The person could be rotated. This would enable the access to the 
firsthand information of corporate security, and on the other hand, the security team would 
get more direct contact with the top management, enabling a better decision making. 
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The case company should consider how to make employees more aware of their security re-
sponsibilities: 
 Project risk management 
 Escalating problem situation & incidents 
 Reporting incidents 
 
7.2 Risk management 
 
Two major risk assessments were conducted in the case company during 2016. The first one 
was conducted to map out risks in four core areas: Operative, Strategic, Economic and Dam-
age risk areas. The second risk assessment was conducted to one of the core business areas of 
the company, and it didn’t provide much additional information. Later on, the risk manage-
ment process was assigned to a work group. It remains to be seen how this arrangement will 
function. 
 
First risk assessment was conducted on higher levels and concerned rather strategic risks. The 
risk assessment should be conducted step by step in lower levels, as the second risk assess-
ment was performed. Though it didn’t generate much additional information, the cascading 
should be carried on. Defining the critical processes and conducting the risk assessment to 
them should be the next step. 
 
The aspect of risk assessment enabling the taking of managed risks should be considered in 
the case company. The idea is that the risk assessment brings up likely risks of new possibili-
ties; this would enable the preparations and control of the risk before utilizing the risks. 
 
7.3 Contingency plan 
 
Critical processes of the core business operations and key support services need to be de-
fined. These processes could be described as indispensable for the success of the business 
operations.  
 
The following factors could be included: 
 Recognizing markets  
 Success in sales  
 Project work 
 Personnel and coping at work 
 Work spaces and equipment 
 Information management 
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Contingency plan which takes in to account the risks of critical processes with major negative 
impact to the company’s business operations should be established. The risks which have high 
magnitude effect should all be considered in the contingency plan. Risks which have high fre-
quency, but low magnitude, are not as necessary to be included in the contingency plan, but 
rather require actions to lower the frequency rate. 
 
The plan should include the most critical factors. Those factors could be: 
 How long the company’s economy can stand the complete halt of business operations 
 Spare workspaces 
 Spare equipment 
 Information connections  
 Recovery of information 
 Working capability and repositioning of personnel 
 
These measures should be conducted at least to a certain minimum preparedness level. There 
is a clear chain of communication and initiation of proper procedures in case of a significant 
risk realizes. It’s not inevitable that all the critical operating processes have risks which have 
significant magnitude to the company’s operations. A decision should be made which risks 
could potentially cause a severe business operation interruption and should be prepared to 
with a contingency plan. On the final stage of contingency plan the procedures should be re-
hearse. 
 
7.4 Metrics & Monitoring 
 
The case company is in a state, where clear corporate security metrics are not achieved, and 
the ones which are being measured, are not forming in to clear processes. The problem in the 
situation seems to be the expectations between the top management and the security team. 
The latter awaits the top management to express what they want to be measured, whereas 
the first seems to expect ready metrics and information of the key measurable factors to be 
handed out. 
 
The only official security meter of the top management is sick leaves. The resources which 
are used to security are also monitored to some extent. This measurement is preferable with 
set targets and with a scale whether or not those targets are achieved. The company has exe-
cuted a security plan annually since 2014, and it is accepted by the Support Services Manage-
ment Team, but the responsibility for the plan has been left to the CSO and the security 
team. The security team should implement a security year clock to enhance its efficiency. It 
would offer the top management a tool to better follow the performed security work. 
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The top management should increase security managerial point of view: the corporate securi-
ty and the continuity perspective should be taken account in decision making. Also, the goals 
of security management and metrics should be created. These metrics could be: 
 Most significant incidents 
 The costs and interruption caused by incidents  
 The decisions and actions of the security team 
 Internal security trainings and the participant count  
 Corporate security support requests 
 Customers’ preconditions for the case company’s corporate security 
 Follow-up of the corporate security development and resources 
 
7.5 Incidents management 
 
Corporate security incidents have been processed on individual level, in the security team, 
the Support Service Management Team and the top management. When incidents are man-
aged on multiple levels, the information of incidents is harder to deal with, and it doesn’t 
necessary reach the responsible personnel. Without proper management, the incident man-
agement suffers from delays, missing of conclusions or forgetting of the incidents. 
 
Incident management records give valuable information from the state of the company’s cor-
porate security threats and vulnerabilities, which further on help the company to direct 
measures. The recognition of information collected from incidents and its analysis require 
development of a better information management. Appointing responsible person(s) to man-
age the procedure should be considered. 
 
The security team has a proposal of the incident management procedure marking the mana-
gerial responsibility for the security team. The team determines the responsible entity to 
handle an individual incident. This proposal and management procedure is already in use, but 
requires recognition and validation. Later on, the incident management procedure should in-
clude the roles of key interest groups, such as customers, employees, higher management and 
partners.  
 
The escalation of incidents to higher management levels requires development: 
 Appoint person to be responsible for corporate security incident management 
 Implementing severity scale of incidents which includes escalation points. These 
could be tied to the costs, time, interest group or theme 
 Define type of incidents which require escalation 
 Agree with higher management levels of which incidents they want to be acknowl-
edged 
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 Defining the difference between security incident and quality incident 
 Every employee to recognize incidents on normal work and how to report and esca-
late 
 Agreement on incident management responsibilities, roles and escalating should be 
established and deployed to interest groups 
 
7.6 Implementation of security activities 
 
Implementation of security activities in the case company happens through the security team, 
sometimes including a consultation of the top management. The security team and the top 
management should agree on the implementation of security activities. For example: Corpo-
rate security team proposal to the top management => Review and comments of the top man-
agement => Corporate security team modification => Modified proposals => Accept/reject => 
Orientation of corporate security team, CSO, departments and other interest groups.  
 
Development objectives of implementation of security procedures: 
 A process of gathering and changing information between the security team and busi-
ness should be established. The current information sources should be identified, e.g. 
every employee, project manager, e-mail, hearsay or other ways of communication. 
Popular information channels should be recognized, the main information collection 
channels should be chosen and informed to the users to simplify the gathering pro-
cess. However, receiving information from other sources has to be possible, but still 
the recording of information must be guaranteed. 
 Agree on how the security processes are implemented to the operations of the case 
company. (Acceptation, orientation, use and continuous development) 
 Security instructions of the middle management. A manual which would include main 
sections of corporate security and a harmonized description of procedures. Also, the 
most important factors and subjects required by the most relative interest groups. 
The guide could include instructions of security procedures and services which are 
available for employees. The manual could be included in the quality handbook. 
 Promote corporate security in a positive manner. Corporate security is a supportive 
function and the purpose is to help employees. The aim is to make employees more 
aware of, it and willing to contact the security team, in case of uncertainty or inci-
dents. The image of penalty and extra work when contacting security should be re-
duced to minimum. 
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7.7 Reflections 
 
The case company offered an information rich and  a challenging environment. The company 
was large enough for various phenomena to study and multiple components to develop. The 
used research methods served well the purpose of the thesis. Information from some key 
functions could have added nuances to the thesis. 
 
The Capability Maturity Model Integration offered an inspiring and challenging platform to 
evaluate corporate security service. The process areas were thoroughly described, and they 
gave suitable frames for the evaluation. The Generic and specific goals of process areas were 
a precise measurement tool. The evaluation of the original model was too strict, so the eval-
uation system was loosened, and the generic practices were accentuated. In the results the 
table of generic goal evaluation is present, but the evaluation of specific goals is absent. The 
specific goals goes in detailed level how a process area should be run. Considering the state 
of corporate security in the company, a deeper analysis of specific goals would have been 
premature and unfair, since the model was implemented for the first time. 
 
Visibility of the top management decision making and project work could have been more 
comprehensive. The actions that the top management execute have an impact to corporate 
security and the security team. A better vision to the top management could have offered 
information from commitment, situation awareness and communications of the top manage-
ment to the organization and security team. The basic business operation of the case compa-
ny is project work. A deeper perception of project work could have given a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the security needs and defects in the everyday work. 
 
Corporate security development is a complicated research object. When handling security as 
a supportive activity, instead of the main product the approach changes. When security is the 
wanted goal it’s acceptable to do whatever it takes to achieve the wanted objective. While 
having security as a supportive factor the resources are allocated according to the require-
ments of accomplishing the main objective. Understanding this contributes for a healthier 
partnership between security and business. 
 
7.8 Thesis evaluation by the thesis supervisor in the case company 
 
Choosing thesis topic, aim of the thesis 
Case company has a clear need to develop corporate security further from its current state, 
the thesis clearly responses to this need. Kalle has been integral part of company’s safety & 
security team during internship, gaining clear view for current state of corporate security and 
development issues. Furthermore, Kalle has shown to be able to work in changing environ-
ment due to personnel changes during internship. 
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Theoretical framework 
The field where case company operates gives some limitations to source material. The field 
has not been researched in large scale and therefore the amount of publications is limited. 
Chosen CMMI is applicable for case company operations.  
 
Methods, thesis process, ethical issues, reliability 
The methods used in thesis process are described in thesis. Written descriptions and actual 
methods are in line with each other. Chosen methods are applicable for thesis process keep-
ing in mind the thesis limitations – thesis considers safety & security services leaving safety 
work at production off from thesis. Co-working with company thesis supervisor has been con-
stant, but in a productive way, Kalle has worked independently during actual thesis writing 
process. During the end of internship, the current state of thesis and findings were communi-
cated to larger audience.  
 
Results and recommendations 
The results of the thesis are what were expected. From the thesis, key findings can be direct-
ly converted to development projects, and analysis of interviews gives good background in-
formation about the ways safety and security should be developed in future. 
 
Presentation, written form of the Thesis 
As a result from the problems outlined in theoretical framework-section, chapters introducing 
the reader to CMMI-model seem to be a bit out from the scope of work at first sight. Issue is 
dealt with later on, which leaves no open questions. Overall, the form and language used in 
thesis is clear and punctual.
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
General questions 
1. What is your position? 
2. Could you tell about your education & work background and if you have worked 
before with security? 
3. How long have you been working for the company? 
4. How would you define corporate security? 
5. Who is responsible for corporate security in the company? 
6. How corporate security appears in business? 
 
Measurement and Analysis 
1. How corporate security is measured in the company? 
Process and Product Quality Assurance 
2. Does corporate security have quality demands? How is their fulfillment ensured?  
Supplier Agreement Management 
3. How are the company’s security related agreements administered? 
Work Monitoring and Control 
4. How corporate security and its development related work is supervised and how it is 
controlled in the company?  
Work Planning 
5. How would you describe the corporate security work planning in the company? 
Capability and Availability Management 
6. What is the capability and availability of corporate security in the company? Does it 
have a strategy? 
Incident Resolution and Prevention 
7. How are the corporate security incidents and the prevention of the incidents 
managed in the company? 
Integrated Work Management 
8. How is the integration of corporate security work to other work taken in to account in 
the company?  
Organizational Process Definition 
9. Have the corporate security processes of the company been described, if they are 
what kind of issues has been taken in to account in the descriptions?  
Risk Management 
10. How is risk management operated from the perspective of corporate security in the 
company?
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Appendix 2: Observation results 
Entry headline Content Highlights 
Risk analysis seminar (1/3) 
II/2016 
 
 Strategic risks 
 Economical risks 
- Top management, security team 
& industry sectors were well repre-
sented 
- Advantages & disadvantages of 
personnel 
- Information security risks & risk 
mitigation 
- The company has good reputation  
- Wanted partner to co-operation 
projects with rival companies 
- Information systems were debat-
ed 
- Competition is hard 
- Open discussion 
 
Meeting with the CSO II/2016  Time concerns 
 Communication 
- The CSO’s time is going to own 
project work and security work is 
suffering 
- The company had decided on 
major investments without com-
municating with the CSO 
Security team meeting II/2016  Risk analysis seminar 
 Information security 
 Security management & 
communication 
 Crisis communications 
 Occupational health and 
safety 
- Discussion on information security 
vulnerabilities & culture, contro-
versy between information services 
and employees on information 
security 
- Organizing occupational health 
and safety in the company.  
Meeting with the CSO II/2016  Risk analysis seminar 
 Occupational health and 
safety 
- Role ambiguity on occupational 
health and safety issues due to a 
labor safety inspection. 
Support services management 
team meeting III/2016 
 
 Discussion on current is-
sues 
 
- Discussion on crisis communica-
tions possibilities 
- Information security issues 
- SSMT decided to start monitor 
one physical security meter 
Meeting with the CSO III/2016  Security management 
matters 
- Changes to the security team 
coming from top to down 
- CSO has no development discus-
sion on security management du-
ties 
- Question to CSO: “Is security 
working by itself already?” 
- According to CSO, Chief Infor-
mation Officer (CIO) has not 
enough time for security issues 
Risk analysis seminar (2/3) 
III/2016 
 Operative risks 
 Damage risks 
- Top management well presented, 
though CEO and quality manager 
left during the seminar 
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- CSO brought up resource deficit 
on security management 
- Conversation was good & open 
Meeting with industry segment 
representatives III/2016 
 Security matters in partic-
ular industry field 
 This industry field has 
more and severe risks 
- The industry field has clear secu-
rity procedures 
- These procedures are working 
inside the industry but do not ap-
pear at the security management 
of the whole organization. 
Meeting with the CSO III/2016  Risk analysis seminar 
 Security management 
matters 
- Discussion on risk analysis seminar 
- The top management has substi-
tute arrangements but the security 
team is not aware of them 
- CIO is very busy limiting the time 
for security issues 
Meeting with the CSO III/2016  Support service info 
 Last year’s security plan 
 Security managerial mat-
ters 
- Planning the matters to present 
at the support service info 
- Check over & tracking on last 
year’s security plan 
- One industry segment had re-
quested help with security issues 
from the CSO on January. It was 
brought up now.  
Meeting with industry repre-
sentatives III/2016 
 Project work 
 Security management 
- At basic work there are security 
demands from the customer and 
case company 
Risk analysis seminar (3/3) 
III/2016 
 Revision of previous semi-
nars and summary 
- Variability of the involved per-
sonnel was kept as a good factor 
- The case company has responsi-
bility over subcontractors’ work 
- Demand for the risk analysis was 
recognized and will be taken to 
regular use by the top management 
- It-security woke discussion, on 
the other hand there was faith for 
self-performance, but also the 
magnitude of possible incidence 
was addressed 
-No stands were taken to the inci-
dent response capability 
Risk analysis seminar III/2016  Comments of the seminar 
hosts (No case company 
representatives present) 
Positive: 
- Well preformed, one of the best 
- Open and willing to develop 
- Strong opinion of the CEO 
- Risk analysis tool was taken in 
real use and not as a standard pro-
cedure  
- Issues were dared to bring up and 
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the top management was chal-
lenged 
 
Negative: 
- Big amount of participants caused 
some passiveness 
- Emphasis of certain areas influ-
enced the whole risk analysis e.g. 
security issues 
Security team meeting 
IV/2016 
 Discussion on risk seminar 
 CSO changing employer 
 New communication man-
ager present 
-Common opinion was that the risk 
seminars were scratch of surface 
- Top management had reviewed 
and modified the results of the risk 
seminar 
- CIO noted that risks are recog-
nized, but resources are not suffi-
cient and important decisions are 
not advancing especially related to 
contingency planning 
- Communications problems were 
defined in the flow of information 
- Top management had decided 
that no fulltime CSO will be ap-
pointed 
Meeting with the CSO IV/2016  CSO changing employer 
 Risk seminar results 
- No meetings with the CEO were 
held during last six months 
- Security co-operation with differ-
ent industries has had difficulties 
- CSO and the top management 
differed in their ideas decisively 
- Top management had decided 
following: 
* Risk management may be used in 
big projects 
* Risk management is included to 
top managements year clock & if 
necessary risk management will be 
continuous process 
* The finance manager will be in 
charge of the risk management 
process 
Intranet announcement 
IV/2016 
 CSO open recruitment - In addition to normal duties 
- Responsibilities of the CSO 
- Development tasks for 2016 
- Task requirements 
E-mail exchange with CIO 
V/2016 
 Proposal for developing 
contingency plan 
- Proposal to assist develop contin-
gency plan 
- Proposal rejected due to strategy 
update and internal processing 
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- A stand will be taken to contin-
gency plan after strategy update is 
complete 
Meeting with CEO V/2016  New CSO 
 Information security audi-
tor competence acquired 
 
- Four CSO candidates inside the 
company 
- Information security auditor com-
petence was acquired to certain 
industry area, this has had improv-
ing impact to the overall security 
of projects 
- Promised security audition in 
future 
Email Overview VI/2016  Information security inci-
dent 
 Information security sup-
port request 
- Information security incident was 
reported and the management of 
the incident was unclear 
- CIO shared a help request to a 
project offer with tight schedule 
Intranet announcement 
VI/2016 
 Experienced new CSO ap-
pointed 
- Responsibilities of CSO 
- Occupational health & safety 
manager tasks 
- Development of corporate securi-
ty 
Security team meeting 
VI/2016 
 New CSO present 
 Pragmatic approach to 
corporate security devel-
opment 
- CSO presented himself 
- He required time until august to 
orientate 
- No big decisions were made 
CEO schedule VIII/2016  Noticed from CEO’s 
schedule 
- Training for challenging situation 
in project work marked in his 
schedule 
- No other information available 
Security team meeting 
IX/2016 
 Security incidents 
 Crisis communication 
guidelines 
 Thesis review 
 Information security train-
ing program offer 
- Nine security incidents were re-
viewed and processed 
- Top management had requested a 
crisis communication guidelines 
- Information security training 
program was reviewed and decided 
to acquire one 
Security team / The CSO 
XI/2016 
 On-going development 
 Security incidents 
 Information security train-
ing program 
 Document classification 
 Incident management pro-
cess 
- Responsibilities were appointed 
on development projects 
- New CSO up to date with corpo-
rate security management 
- Incident processing was inade-
quate compared to the maturity 
model requirements 
- New information security process 
was planned to be taken in use 
* Lack of unambiguous procedure 
within implementation 
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- Draft of documentation classifica-
tion was decided to be done 
- Next year’s (2017) security plan 
was not reviewed  
*It remains to be seen how it will 
be managed 
- Incident management process was 
not reviewed 
 
The CSO XI/2016  Information security train-
ing program presentation 
event 
 Retrospect of the current 
security plan (2016) 
 Review of separately re-
tained documents 
- Common opinion about the infor-
mation security training program 
was that it meets the requirements 
- Implementation and supervision 
of the security plan are heavily 
dependent on the CSO 
- The trainee had personally pre-
served security related documents 
which were then shared 
* The documentation procedure of 
security documents was insufficient 
Overall review XII/2016  Internship nearing the 
end, successor has been 
selected 
 Thesis results 
 Upcoming challenges & 
further development 
needs 
- The successor is from one of the 
industries and continues the work 
in addition to his normal duties  
- First results of thesis are emerg-
ing 
- The company has will, but a 
vague understanding of the overall 
corporate security 
- Upcoming challenges include the 
integration of corporate security to 
the company’s operating culture, 
continuation and implementation 
of risk management procedures 
and development of contingency 
plan 
- The CSO finds work challenging 
with the allocated resources 
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Appendix 3: Summary of interview results of process area questions 
 
Measurement and Analysis 
It is evident that the case company has corporate security metrics in use. The use of the met-
rics on the other hand is not clear. Measurement is taking place on different organization lev-
els, and the corporate security metrics are not commonly agreed. Some of the interviewees 
seem to have a clearer picture that measurements are taking place, but lack the confirmation 
if the measurement really happens, or if the metrics are defined. The current security met-
rics that were detected during the research were mainly defined by the security team, but it 
came evident that the top management also has its own security related metrics. 
 
The metrics has been mainly based on a scale executed/not executed. The tracking of the 
metrics is a responsibility of the metrics owner. This means that the accountable person 
manages the metrics and information from the metrics is mainly, if not only, shared by the 
same person. 
 
The tracking of security metrics and reporting the results has no sophisticated pattern and 
there is no established process to analyse the metrics. Communication about the information 
acquired from the metrics is not established. There is also clear dispersion between employ-
ees working in business and support services. Those who do not work regularly with security 
issues have less information about security metrics. 
 
Process and product quality assurance  
There is a dispersion on corporate security quality requirements and on how they are execut-
ed. Some of the interviewees say that there are requirements, while others say that there are 
no quality requirements or the requirements are not pointed out or set to be tracked by the 
responsible person, excluding the security plan. The whole management of corporate security 
seems to be a bit unclear to some of the interviewees. Then again, corporate security work 
has been divided to different sections and the main responsibility of a particular section is 
assigned to the responsible employee. There was a clear dispersion on how different sections 
had managed the quality assurance. 
 
The security work has qualitative requirements, and the principle is that the requirements 
are filled or unfilled. Legislation sets some corporate security standards to be fulfilled. The 
CSO seemed to have the main role to set the corporate security quality requirements to some 
extent. Also, the customers could set corporate security quality demands, and these demands 
were managed either on project work level or in the top management depending on the task. 
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Supplier agreement management 
Supplier agreement management seems to have well-established processes, and the responsi-
bilities has been divided clearly. The personnel are well aware how the responsibilities are 
divided and how the supplier agreement process works. The supplier agreement management 
had no clear process description.  
 
Work Monitoring and Control 
A yearly corporate security plan is conducted. The plan is accepted by the support service 
management team and CEO, and it is being supervised by the CSO. There was a considerable 
unawareness about the security plan among the interviewees. Control of the actual corporate 
security work was done in the security team. However, The top management followed the 
work of the  security team and allocated resources. The security management work was felt 
to miss certain firmness to get tasks completed by some of the interviewees. 
 
It was pointed out that some of the projects had a stricter security control, and expected the 
control to be on a higher level. Reacting to deviations from security plan relied on the CSO. 
Corporate security development was seen as a general jargon by the common employees.  
 
Work Planning 
The security team members had a better overall picture about the work planning, than inter-
viewees who worked in business. The settled working practice in the security team was first 
to handle acute issues, then current concerns and finally development projects. Some depri-
vation occurred about the corporate security strategy. 
 
Some viewed the security plan as a strategy, and others were opting for a longer period plan. 
Some of the security team members perform independent security planning within their re-
sponsibilities area. 
 
The top management has also made decisions which have affected to the work planning of 
the security team. The planning and clarifying the targets of project of the security team are 
seen somewhat incomplete. Risk-based planning came up as a possible method for work plan-
ning. 
 
Capability And Availability Management  
The capability and availability of the corporate security are not defined. The CSO works in 
addition to his normal duties. Time is granted if there are acute issues, but otherwise the CSO 
has allocated resources to corporate security. Common opinion was that the standard pro-
cesses were running well, and that the system would be measured in time of crisis. The dis-
cussion generally went to crisis situations and to the question whether the resources would be 
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adequate then. There is no written strategy, but some initial agreement has been made. 
There was some confuse about the yearly security plan’s relation to the whole security strat-
egy. 
 
The capability and availability were seen to be on sufficient level, but the usage and increas-
ing awareness of the possibilities for common employees could be improved. The security 
team is capable to produce material, but the capability to make it available is another thing.  
There was some wondering amidst the interviewees whether it is necessary to develop the 
capability management of corporate security. One brought up the question of demand, if 
there is such for corporate security and what is the volume and how to keep the volume at a 
sufficient level. The period without CSO is mentioned as a clear factor which had lowered the 
capability of corporate security function. The question whether the business utilizes the sup-
portive function enough, was raised alike. 
 
Incident Resolution and Prevention 
Incident reports are few and many of them come through unofficial channels, though there 
was an official channel in use. Usually incidents were solved already before the official pro-
cedure in the security team. The practice in case of incidents has been an imminent response 
due to the urgency, and the handling of incident was left to the next security team meeting. 
Since the security team consists of only few members, the need for an incident procedure 
definition was scant. 
 
There were no official criteria for incidents. The description of any incident was missing. An-
other thing is the project incidents which have their own procedures and include other than 
security incidents e.g. quality assurance incidents. A remarkable notification was that there 
are incidents that never reached the awareness of the CSO or of which he was informed long 
after.  
 
Integrated Work Management 
The corporate security work was seen to be very integrated to the organization. The CSO’s 
main work is on business, and the rest of the security team has natural roles in the supportive 
services. Each of these has security duties in addition of their daily job. The security tasks 
integrate well to the normal tasks of the security team members. The current operating mod-
el is considered fine. 
 
In the beginning project management lived its own life, and security procedures were forming 
according to the needs that occurred. The project organization and the security organization 
have been kept apart, the aim is that corporate security would affect through the line organi-
zation. It was mentioned that there is no separate security function and the corporate securi-
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ty is interleaved in the organization. The corporate security has supported business with inci-
dents, challenges and through training. Still, the implementation work to fully support the 
business is unfinished. 
 
Security is seen as a part of daily processes. One interviewee pointed out that security should 
not be done just for security. One opinion was that a requirement for a fulltime Chief Securi-
ty Officer should be based on the needs of the business. 
 
Organizational Process Definition  
Security management and the organization are well described. Some security procedures has 
been described, and a corporate security management system was being planned to be taken 
in use. The system had processes described from above, but the content wasn’t necessarily 
ready. The idea was to get primer from a management system standard which was being ac-
quired at the time. In general, relatively few processes have been described, and the work 
has been purposely left undone, though the existence of some processes are communicated. 
The work of defining processes was depicted as incomplete. 
 
There was some hesitation on the knowledge whether there are process descriptions availa-
ble. One interviewee did not identify process definition at all. An interviewee representing 
business considered the understanding of security processes irrelevant, but acknowledging the 
procedures important. A relatively short informative guideline was preferred to a hundred 
page one, pointing out the wish to have relevant information instead of jargon. There was no 
knowledge of a guideline directed to project managers. 
 
On behalf of information security, there is a description on how to proceed with various pro-
jects. Some of the information security procedures are executed according to the will of cus-
tomer. 
 
Risk Management 
The company has a risk management tool in use which was implemented during 2016. It is 
reviewed twice a year in the top management. Still, the risks are managed in multiple loca-
tions in the company, though many project risks are not directly connected to the corporate 
security. Previously, the  risk management was less organized and it was mainly, on the re-
sponsibility of the CSO and the security team. Some risk assessment has been executed in the 
support services. Since the new tool the risk management has been developing, and the next 
step is to deploy the risk management process down in the organization. The security team 
and the supportive service were seen as a favorable way to slightly expand the risk assess-
ment process. 
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Some measures of crisis preparedness were executed. The company needs to create a contin-
gency plan. Risk mitigation plans and actions have been planned to the most known, biggest 
and important risks. The ext phase is to execute the plans and actions. One of the business 
representatives had an unsound picture of the current state of risk management. 
 
Additional question asking for comments 
The interview questions were felt hard, but good. A wish was to have more determined co-
operation with the top management about goals and strategy to understand the produce of 
additional value through corporate security. Clear security metrics with enough high level 
tracking and continuity were wished at least on yearly basis, so that trends could be spotted. 
 
Lack of resources, the inefficient deployment and need for resourses were brought up. Inter-
viewees with diverse experiences felt that on long-term the development has had an upward 
trend. 
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Appendix 4: Capability & Maturity evaluation of the author and CSO 
 
Generic Goals and Generic Practice Evaluation 
 
Process area Author GG1 GG2 GG3 CSO GG1 GG2 GG3 
Measurement and Analysis 1 0/1/0 3/4/3 0/2/0 1,3 1/0/0 4/5/1 0/1/1 
Process and Product Quality 
Assurance 0,7 0/1/0 4/4/2 0/1/1 1,3 1/0/0 4/5/1 0/2/0 
Supplier Agreement Manage-
ment 1,6 1/0/0 6/4/0 0/1/1 1 0/1/0 0/9/1 0/2/0 
Work Monitoring and Control 1,6 1/0/0 8/2/0 0/1/1 1,3 1/0/0 3/6/1 1/1/0 
Work Planning 1,6 1/0/0 7/3/0 1/1/0 1,3 1/0/0 3/6/1 0/2/0 
Capability And Availability Man-
agement 0,3 0/1/0 2/6/2 0/0/2 1,3 1/0/0 3/6/1 0/2/0 
Incident Resolution and Preven-
tion 1,6 1/0/0 5/5/0 1/1/0 1 1/0/0 0/9/1 0/0/2 
Integrated Work Management 1 1/0/0 4/5/1 0/0/2 1,3 1/0/0 1/8/1 0/2/0 
Organizational Process Defini-
tion  0,3 0/1/0 0/4/6 0/0/2 1,3 1/0/0 2/7/1 0/2/0 
Risk Management 0,3 0/1/0 2/4/4 0/0/2 0,6 1/0/0 0/6/4 0/0/2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific Goals and Specific Practice Evaluation 
 
Process area Author SG1 SG2 SG3 CSO SG1 SG2 SG3 
Maturity level 2 process areas         Measurement and Analysis 1 0/2/2 2/2/0  1 1/2/1 1/3/0  Process and Product Quality 
Assurance 0,5 0/2/0 0/0/2  2 2/0/0 2/0/0  Supplier Agreement Manage-
ment 1,5 1/1/1 3/0/0  1 0/3/0 1/2/0  Work Monitoring and Control 1 3/4/0 0/3/0  1,5 4/3/0 1/2/0  Work Planning 1,3 2/3/0 4/2/1 1/2/0 1 1/2/2 3/4/0 0/2/1 Maturity level 3 process areas         Capability And Availability Man-
agement 0,5 0/2/1 0/0/3  1,5 1/1/1 2/0/0  Incident Resolution and Preven-
tion 2 2/0/0 4/1/0 3/0/0 2 2/0/0 4/1/0 2/1/0 Integrated Work Management 1,5 3/4/0 2/1/0  2 4/3/0 2/1/0  Organizational Process Defini-
tion  0 0/4/3   1 2/4/1   Risk Management 0,3 0/2/1 0/2/0 0/0/2 0,7 1/2/0 0/1/1 0/1/1  
